

# Service Trade, Regional Specialization, and Welfare<sup>\*</sup>

Yuancheng Han<sup>†</sup>  
Reserve Bank of New Zealand

Jorge Miranda-Pinto<sup>‡</sup>  
University of Queensland  
International Monetary Fund

Satoshi Tanaka<sup>§</sup>  
University of Queensland

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## Abstract

How much does trade in services affect regional production specialization and welfare? Using unique Canadian trade data, we document that the size of inter-provincial service trade is comparable to that of good trade, and that net exports of services are highly correlated with the value-added share of services across provinces. With a spatial model featuring domestic and international trade, we quantify the effects of service trade. Our results highlight that domestic service trade significantly promotes regional specialization, with heterogeneous welfare gains that reduce regional disparities. Conversely, international service trade generates more uniform welfare gains across provinces.

**JEL Classification:** E20, F10, L16

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<sup>†</sup>Contact: ryan.han@rbnz.govt.nz

<sup>‡</sup>Contact: j.mirandapinto@uq.edu.au

<sup>§</sup>Contact: s.tanaka@uq.edu.au

# 1 Introduction

Services play a significant role in trade, both within and between countries. The World Trade Organization (WTO, 2019) documents that, during 2005–2017, trade in services grew faster than trade in goods and accounts for over 20% of the world’s total trade. Yet, considering that services are the largest sector in the economy, service trade is still relatively small.<sup>1</sup> In this regard, the WTO states that increasing trade in services could “*create significant welfare gains for society through a more efficient allocation of resources, greater economies of scale, and an increase in the variety of services on offer.*” Despite the significance of services and the importance of trade in the allocation of resources, the existing literature often assumes that services are non-traded.<sup>2</sup>

This paper aims to fill this gap by showing that domestic and international service trade have significant effects on regional production specialization—which we measure using the regional value-added share of services—and welfare. Using unique Canadian trade data, we show that service trade, especially domestic service trade, is significant in its volume. We further show that net exports of services are quite heterogeneous across Canadian provinces and highly correlated with the sectoral composition of the regions. Based on these empirical findings, we construct a spatial model featuring domestic and international trade in goods and services. We calibrate the model and quantify the impact of trade in services on regional specialization and welfare in the counterfactual exercises.

We start by documenting that domestic trade in services—imports plus exports—relative to GDP is of similar magnitude to that of goods, while international trade in services is about a fourth of international trade in goods. We then establish the empirical correlation that motivates our quantitative exercise. We show that there is an important link between net regional exports of services and the value-added share of services in regional GDP. To do so, we first classify sectors in the economy into four: good, high-tradable services, mid-tradable services, and low-tradable services.<sup>3</sup> We find a strong positive correlation between the net exports of services to GDP ratio and the value-added share of high-tradable services. Furthermore, this correlation becomes weaker for mid-tradable services and declines

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<sup>1</sup>See Lewis, Monarch, Sposi and Zhang (2020).

<sup>2</sup>The importance of trade in the allocation of resources is discussed in Levchenko and Zhang (2012) and Coşar and Fajgelbaum (2016), for example, while their focus is on good trade.

<sup>3</sup>Our high-tradable service sectors are transportation and warehousing, administrative support, accommodation and food services, professional and technical services, information and cultural industries, arts, entertainment and recreation, and wholesale and retail trade. Mid-tradable service sectors are finance and real estate, and other services (except public administration), while health care and social assistance, and educational services are classified as low-tradable sectors.

further for low-tradable services. This relationship holds for both domestic net exports and international net exports, with a stronger correlation for domestic net exports.

To rationalize these findings and to study the different channels in which service trade shapes regional specialization, we develop a four-sector model with multiple regions and the rest of the world in the spirit of [Eaton and Kortum \(2002\)](#). We introduce domestic and international trade in services to the model. In each sector, there is a continuum of competitive firms that engage in domestic and international trade. The economy also displays input-output linkages. Finally, to account for the heterogeneity in consumption expenditure shares across regions at different income levels, we follow [Uy, Yi and Zhang \(2013\)](#) and [Comin, Lashkari and Mestieri \(2021\)](#) and assume that the representative household in each region displays non-homothetic preferences.<sup>4</sup> In particular, we allow for heterogeneous income elasticity of demand for services and goods sectors.

Our calibration of the model takes two steps. First, we calibrate the production side of the model to match the observed production structure of Canadian provinces and the rest of the world for the period 1992–2017. Second, we estimate the parameters of our non-homothetic CES demand system using the Non-Linear Least Squares with consumption expenditure shares. Our estimates indicate that goods, as well as high-, mid-, and low-tradable services, complement each other. The estimates also indicate that low-tradable services are luxuries compared to mid- and high-tradable services.

Using the calibrated model, we conduct a set of counterfactual exercises to quantify the role of domestic and international service trade in shaping regional specialization and welfare. In the exercises, we increase the trade barriers across provinces and/or between provinces and the rest of the world so that services are not traded in equilibrium. We interpret our exercise as an increase in the cost of exporting services due to regulations or the absence of digital technologies that allow the provision of services remotely (e.g., financial services via internet or phone call).<sup>5</sup>

Absent domestic service trade, the real income shrinks for all Canadian provinces, leading to a decrease in service share due to non-homotheticities in demand. This income effect dominates a price effect driven by complementarity, as the relative price of services rises. As a result, the share of services decreases in Canada as a whole. However, there is significant

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<sup>4</sup>While non-homothetic preferences have been widely used in the structural transformation literature, they are also relevant in accounting for cross-sectional consumption patterns across households and regions (e.g., [De Nardi, 2004](#); [Mian et al., 2021](#); [Sposi, 2019](#)).

<sup>5</sup>Indeed, in 2017, Canadian provinces signed the Canadian Free Trade Agreement (<https://www.cfta-alec.ca/>) to facilitate trade of services (and goods) across provincial borders. The agreement aims to lower barriers related to regulations, licensing, registration, and access to government procurement between provinces.

heterogeneity across provinces in the extent of price and income effects. The changes in the industrial composition of each province, therefore, vary significantly, depending on these forces and changes in net exports. On the other hand, the absence of international service trade triggers uniform reductions in real income with smaller positive price effects. In this case, the income effect largely outweighs the price effects, reducing services consumption expenditure and causing an even greater decline in provinces' value-added share of services.

These changes brought about by domestic and international trade in services have sizable welfare effects in Canadian provinces. Domestic service trade increases the average real wage in Canada by 6%, which is comparable to the gains from domestic good trade. However, the dispersion of gains across provinces is three times larger for services than for goods. For international service trade, the increase in average real wage is 4%. Unlike the domestic service trade, the gains are more uniform across provinces. To understand the source of heterogeneous welfare gains, we examine the factors contributing to the heterogeneity. We follow [Di Giovanni, Levchenko and Zhang \(2014\)](#) and plot the regional welfare gains of service trade against the ratio of regional imports or exports of services to GDP. We observe a clear positive relationship between welfare gains and regional trade openness. The provinces with larger gains from service trade are those that import a significant amount of services relative to their GDP. In particular, Northwest Territories displays the largest services imports to GDP ratio in Canada and also the largest welfare gain from service trade (a 27% increase in real wages). This is an example of how trade in services can mitigate regional disparities by allowing smaller and relatively less productive provinces to access cheaper tradable services and to specialize in the sector with their comparative advantage. For Canada as a whole, we find that domestic service trade reduces the standard deviation of log real wages across provinces by 19%.<sup>6</sup>

Finally, we study the implications of service trade for structural transformation. Our results suggest that, while domestic service trade is crucial in accounting for regional specialization, it did not play a significant role in driving the observed reallocation of economic activity between 1992 and 2017 at the national level. We then show that international service trade accounts for two-thirds of the rise in the Canadian high-tradable sector's value-added share for the period 1992–2017. Absent international trade, the value-added share of high-tradable services would have increased 1.5 percentage points, from 30.8% to 32.3%, rather than the observed 2.2 percentage points increase in the data.

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<sup>6</sup>In our Appendix B.3, we provide the results of an alternative counterfactual exercise that equalizes the relative productivity of services with respect to goods across regions. The results show similar effects on regional value-added shares and welfare compared to our baseline counterfactual that increases trade barriers.

## Related literature

Our work makes contributions to three strands of literature. First, we contribute to the literature investigating the welfare implications of domestic and international trade (e.g., [Waugh, 2010](#); [Levchenko and Zhang, 2012](#); [Caliendo and Parro, 2014](#); [Di Giovanni, Levchenko and Zhang, 2014](#); [Coşar and Fajgelbaum, 2016](#); [Lewis, Monarch, Sposi and Zhang, 2020](#)). Within this literature, our paper is novel in that it studies the implications of trade in services for regional welfare.<sup>7</sup> Our results point to economically relevant and heterogeneous welfare consequences of service trade across provinces, and provide new insights into regional disparities.

We also contribute to the literature studying the role of trade in shaping the industrial structure of an economy (e.g., [Uy, Yi and Zhang, 2013](#); [Świącki, 2017](#); [Cravino and Sotelo, 2019](#)). Our paper contributes to this literature by studying the role that domestic and international trade in services has had on regional industrial structure. Most studies emphasize how trade in goods indirectly shapes the service share via affecting goods' relative price and household income ([Uy, Yi and Zhang, 2013](#)), and via the structure of inter-sectoral linkages between goods and services ([Cravino and Sotelo, 2019](#); [Sposi, 2019](#)). We focus on the direct role that services trade, domestic and international, had played in shaping regional production specialization and aggregate structural transformation. Within this literature (e.g., [Buera and Kaboski, 2012](#); [Duarte and Restuccia, 2019](#); [Duernecker, Herrendorf and Valentinyi, 2023](#)), our work also contributes by proposing an alternative approach to disaggregate service sectors, based on their tradability.

Finally, we contribute to the recent literature that studies the importance of service trade in shaping regional production specialization (e.g., [Rossi-Hansberg, Sarte and Schwartzman, 2019, 2021](#); [Eckert, 2019](#)). Different from these papers that focus on the US economy where service trade data is not available, we use available Canadian data on regional and international trade in services to quantitatively analyze a spatial model featuring domestic and international trade in goods and services.

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<sup>7</sup>For example, [Waugh \(2010\)](#) studies the implications of asymmetric trade costs in good trade between rich and poor countries for their welfare. This paper's focus, on the other hand, is on how service trade impacts regional disparities within a country.

## 2 Empirical findings

This section presents a number of empirical findings on trade in services and regional specialization in Canada. After describing the Canadian trade flows data, we first present gross and net trade flows in goods and services in Canada, both domestic and international. We then document the relationship between net exports of services and regional production specialization in services—measured by the regional value-added share of services.

### 2.1 Canadian trade flows data

Given the unique nature of Canadian service trade data, we describe here how sectoral trade flows across Canadian provinces and between Canadian provinces and the rest of the world are constructed, while we provide more details in Appendix E.1. The derivation of Canadian trade flows since the late nineties was described in detail in [Généreux and Langen \(2002\)](#).

In general, Canadian trade flow measures are constructed in two steps. First, raw inter-provincial and international trade flows are collected from administrative statistics and various surveys. The international data are primarily sourced from the Canadian International Merchandise Trade and the Canadian Balance of International Payments. The measures of inter-provincial trade are obtained from commodity surveys for the origin and destination of sales.<sup>8</sup> For some sectors, official data or surveys do not exist. Therefore, some trade flows are allocated provincially using provincial demand.<sup>9</sup> Once the information is collected, in the second step, these data are adjusted to reconcile with provincial supply and demand Input-Output (IO) tables. The integrated IO framework addresses issues related to data gaps, conceptual discrepancies, and measurement challenges. Finally, trade flows, both inter-provincially and internationally, should completely align with Canadian national account data.

Overall, this dataset represents a significant improvement compared to existing datasets, as emphasized by [Agnosteva, Anderson and Yotov \(2019\)](#), despite the challenges. For the purposes of our empirical and calibration exercises, it is crucial to have reasonable measures of service trade as well as good across Canadian provinces and between Canada and the rest of the world. This dataset therefore has significant advantages for our analysis.

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<sup>8</sup>For example, trade flows for business and computer services are constructed using the destination of sales from the Statistics Canada Annual Surveys of Services Industries. See Appendix E.1.

<sup>9</sup>For example, the trade volume for advertising sales and telephone communications is estimated using provincial sectoral demand data. See Appendix E.1.

TABLE 1 – Domestic and international gross trade flows relative to GDP for goods and services, averaged over 1992–2017, Canada

Provinces	Goods		Services	
	Domestic	International	Domestic	International
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Canada	0.24	0.60	0.21	0.14
Alberta	0.28	0.51	0.20	0.10
British Columbia	0.19	0.43	0.21	0.15
Manitoba	0.38	0.49	0.34	0.12
New Brunswick	0.49	0.86	0.37	0.13
Newfoundland and Labrador	0.33	0.63	0.27	0.08
Northwest Territories including Nunavut	0.40	0.49	0.45	0.07
Nova Scotia	0.35	0.49	0.32	0.11
Ontario	0.18	0.71	0.18	0.17
Prince Edward Island	0.47	0.39	0.45	0.11
Quebec	0.25	0.57	0.19	0.13
Saskatchewan	0.39	0.58	0.28	0.12
Yukon	0.32	0.32	0.47	0.14

Notes: The numbers represent gross trade flows (exports plus imports). All the values are calculated as the trade flow value in a region relative to the region’s GDP. Source: Statistics Canada.

## 2.2 Trade flows in goods and services in Canada

### Gross trade flows

Table 1 reports the gross trade flows (exports plus imports). All the values are calculated as the trade flow value in a region relative to the region’s GDP. The table shows those values for good and service sectors, domestic and international, respectively, which are all averaged over the period 1992 – 2007.

Two facts hold. First, on average, domestic service trade is of a similar magnitude to domestic good trade. At the national level, for the period 1992–2017, the average ratio of total trade in services to GDP is 0.21, while that of goods is 0.24.<sup>10</sup> Second, the magnitude of international service trade is also of significant importance. It is roughly one-fourth of international good trade, which amounts to 0.14 at the national level.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>10</sup>At the national level, Figure A.1 of Appendix A shows the evolution of trade in goods and services in Canada. While the sample period is not particularly long, we do observe a positive trend in domestic service trade. On the other hand, international service trade has also increased mildly, similar to the pattern documented in Eaton and Kortum (2018).

<sup>11</sup>In Table A.1 of Appendix A, we provide, for each province, information on services exports by destination. For example, we observe that only British Columbia reports higher international exports of services




FIGURE 1 – Domestic and international net exports of services to GDP ratios, averaged over 1992–2017

### Net trade flows

We next describe the patterns of service trade in terms of net exports (i.e., exports minus imports). Figure 1 depicts the average net exports to GDP ratio for Canadian provinces on a heatmap for domestic (left panel) and international (right panel) service trade flows.

Two important facts stand out here. First, as observed in Figure 1, there is considerable heterogeneity in domestic net exports of services relative to regional GDP. Ontario, in blue in the figure, is the only Canadian province with positive net exports of services, but it can be seen that there are significant differences among other net importers of services. Second, as the right panel in Figure 1 shows, there is very little heterogeneity in terms of international net exports of services. The figure shows that most Canadian provinces are net exporters of services to the rest of the world and do not differ much in the extent to which they do so. This difference in the pattern of heterogeneity between domestic and international service trade leads to an important difference in the impacts of domestic and international service trade on welfare, as will be highlighted later.

TABLE 2 – Sectoral gross trade (imports plus exports) to gross output ratio in 2017

Sector	Industry	(1)	(2)	(3)
		Total	Domestic	International
High-tradable services (> 30%)	Transportation and warehousing	63.52%	32.64%	30.88%
	Administrative and support	60.77%	31.48%	29.29%
	Accommodation and food services	57.34%	19.49%	37.85%
	Professional and technical services	53.81%	32.59%	21.23%
	Information and cultural industries	52.60%	33.13%	19.47%
	Arts, entertainment and recreation	50.68%	19.63%	31.05%
	Wholesale and retail trade	38.10%	26.62%	11.48%
Mid-tradable services (10% - 30%)	Finance, insurance, real estate and leasing	23.92%	16.32%	7.61%
	Other services (except public administration)	18.84%	15.16%	3.68%
Low-tradable services (< 10%)	Educational services	9.14%	2.80%	6.34%
	Health care and social assistance	2.85%	1.93%	0.92%

Notes: This table classifies service industries into three categories: high-tradable, mid-tradable, and low-tradable services. Column “Total” reports the ratio of total imports plus total exports to gross output in each sector, which can be decomposed by the domestic trade-to-output ratio (Column “Domestic”) and international trade-to-output ratio (Column “International”). The industry “other services (except public administration)” is constructed by a) repair and maintenance, b) grant-making, civic and similar organizations, and c) personal and laundry services. Source: Canadian Regional Input-Output Tables from Statistics Canada.

## Heterogeneity in tradability of services

We next examine the tradability of services provided by each service sector. Table 2 reports the trade values (imports plus exports) relative to sectoral gross output for 11 service industries. Columns 1 to 3 report the values for total trade, domestic trade, and international trade, respectively.

As shown in the table, there are substantial differences in the volumes of service trade, domestically and internationally, across service sectors.<sup>12</sup> For example, more than 60% of gross output is traded in the transportation and warehousing industry and the administrative support industry. On the other hand, finance, insurance, real estate, and leasing services

compared to domestic exports of services. On the other hand, Ontario and Alberta are the two main destinations for services exports, representing 20% and 10%, respectively, of the total service exports for the average province.

<sup>12</sup>In Tables A.2 and A.3 of Appendix A, we provide more detailed information on regional exports of services. We observe that provinces such as Ontario focus their domestic exports of services on financial services and professional services. On the other hand, while Northwest territories primarily exports transportation services and Saskatchewan mainly exports wholesale trade services. In terms of international exports of services, Ontario and Quebec concentrate their exports on professional services, while Yukon and Nunavut mainly export accommodation services.




FIGURE 2 – Value-added and consumption expenditure shares of services, averaged over 1992–2017.

present a ratio of 23.92%, which is mainly driven by domestic trade (16.32%). Finally, as expected, educational and health services are hardly traded, with exports plus imports to gross output ratios of 9.14% and 2.85%, respectively.

Given this heterogeneity, we classify service sectors into three categories: *high-tradable service*, *mid-tradable service*, and *low-tradable service*. With this classification, we analyze the patterns of trade and industrial specialization across Canadian provinces. We consider high-tradable services as those sectors with exports plus imports to gross output ratio larger than 30%. Mid-tradable services are those services with a ratio of exports to imports to gross output between 10% and 30%, while low-tradable services display a ratio below 10%.

### 2.3 Regional specialization in services

A natural implication of the trade patterns documented in Section 2.2 is that certain provinces in Canada specialize in the production of services. We confirm this point here by documenting the significant degree of regional specialization in service value-added (VA) shares.

The left panel of Figure 2 shows the degree of regional heterogeneity in service production in VA for the period 1992–2017.<sup>13</sup> Provinces with lighter colors present smaller VA shares in services, while provinces with darker colors are more specialized in services. For example,

<sup>13</sup>We obtained sectoral nominal VA data by provinces from Statistics Canada. See Appendix E.2 for details.

British Columbia, the most service-intensive province, has an average VA share of services for the period 1992–2017 of 57%, contrasting with the 38% in Newfoundland and Labrador.

For comparison, in the right panel of Figure 2, we plot the consumption expenditure share of services across provinces.<sup>14</sup> As observed in the figure, there is very limited heterogeneity in regional consumption expenditure shares, indicating that regional specialization in production is not driven by regional differences in demand. This point is also evident in Columns 1 and 2 in Table 3, where the standard deviation of services consumption expenditure shares (0.03) is less than half of that of VA shares (0.08).<sup>15</sup>

The sharp contrast between the left and right panels of Figure 2 raises the question of what determines regional heterogeneity in VA shares. One possible explanation is domestic and international trade: as demonstrated in Uy, Yi and Zhang (2013), in an open economy setting, the VA share is a function of domestic consumption expenditure and net international exports. Therefore, if the consumption expenditure share of services does not exhibit regional heterogeneity, whereas the VA share does, then trade could be considered a plausible explanation.

The third row of Table 3 confirms that the service trade plays an important role in explaining the regional heterogeneity in VA shares. As observed in Column 3, the overall correlation between net exports of services, relative to regional GDP, and VA shares is positive (0.33). The correlation more than doubles (0.71) when we consider the high-tradable services.<sup>16</sup> In Columns 4 and 5, we also show the correlations with VA shares for domestic and international net exports in services relative to the regional GDP. While both are positive, domestic service trade shows a somewhat higher correlation for the group of highly traded services. These results suggest that interprovincial trade of services is key to explaining the heterogeneity in service VA shares across Canadian provinces.

In the next section, we develop a multi-region and multi-sector model to study the role that service trade plays in shaping trade patterns and regional specialization in Canada. The model displays domestic and international trade in goods and services, heterogeneity in

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<sup>14</sup>We provide details on how we constructed the Consumption Expenditure data by sector in Appendix E.2.

<sup>15</sup>The consumption expenditure data used here are on a sectoral gross output basis and cannot be directly compared with the sectoral VA without ad hoc assumptions about the input-output linkage matrix. Therefore, we consider the results in this section to be suggestive evidence and leave more precise analyses to our quantitative model section which has full input-output linkages. The same argument applies to the comparison between net exports and VA.

<sup>16</sup>Figure A.2 in our Appendix plots provinces' VA shares in services (average 1992–2017) in the y-axis and the consumption expenditure share of services (left panel) and the net export share of services (right panel). We observe a clear positive relationship, indicating that trade and consumption are key drivers of regional specialization in production.

TABLE 3 – Services VA shares, consumption expenditure shares, and net exports of services in Canadian provinces

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	VA share	Cons. share	$\frac{\text{NEX}}{\text{Regional GDP}}$	$\frac{\text{Dom. NEX}}{\text{Regional GDP}}$	$\frac{\text{Int. NEX}}{\text{Regional GDP}}$
Mean value	0.66	0.69	-0.06	-0.09	0.03
Standard dev.	0.08	0.03	0.08	0.08	0.02
Corr. with VA share	-	0.43	0.33	0.26	0.39
Corr. with high-trad. VA share	0.79	0.66	0.71	0.65	0.35
Corr. with mid-trad. VA share	0.95	0.52	0.35	0.28	0.33
Corr. with low-trad. VA share	0.58	-0.32	-0.43	-0.48	0.22

Notes: This table reports the mean (row 1) and the standard deviation (row 2) of the value-added share (Column 1), the consumption expenditure share (Column 2), and the net export share in GDP (Columns 3 to 5) of services for Canadian provinces (averaged over the period 1992–2017). The last row shows the correlation of each variable with the service VA share. Source: Statistics Canada.

sectoral productivity growth, and non-homotheticity in preferences, which will allow us to disentangle the different mechanisms at play. This is, i) sectoral productivity differentials across regions; ii) income heterogeneity and non-homotheticities in demand; and iii) trade in services. Our structural model allows us to answer two relevant questions that empirics alone cannot address. First, what is the role of service trade in shaping the industrial structure in Canada? Second, what are the welfare gains/losses from trade in services?

### 3 Model

Our model extends the model in [Caliendo and Parro \(2014\)](#) to account for domestic and international trade in services and to consider the role of non-homotheticities in demand. Our objective is, through the lens of a four-sector multi-regions model, to analyze the role of domestic and international trade in goods and services in shaping Canada’s industrial structure between 1992–2017. We consider two countries: Canada and the rest of the world (RoW). In Canada, we assume there are  $J$  provinces. In each province, there are four sectors: goods ( $g$ ), high-tradable services ( $hs$ ), mid-tradable services ( $ms$ ), and low-tradable services ( $ls$ ). Firms use labor and intermediate inputs as factors of production.

We assume that firms in each province export and import goods and all types of services for intermediate input purposes with other provinces, as well as with the rest of the world. Trade is costly, and we model that through the existence of iceberg costs. As in [Eaton and Kortum \(2002\)](#), trade has Ricardian motives. Producers differ in their productivity and

the trade costs associated with trading with different regions. In equilibrium, firms source the cheapest intermediate input. There is a representative household in each province who consumes the three goods produced domestically.

### 3.1 Production and trade

In region  $i$  and sector  $k \in \{g, hs, ms, ls\}$  there is a continuum of goods' producers  $z \in [0, 1]$  whose production technology is given by

$$Y_{i,t}^k(z) = Z_{i,t}^k(z) [T_{i,t}^k L_{i,t}^k(z)]^{\lambda_{i,k}} \left[ \prod_{n=g,hs,ms,ls} \left( M_{i,t}^{k,n}(z) \right)^{\gamma_{i,k,n}} \right]^{1-\lambda_{i,k}}, \quad (3.1)$$

where  $Y_{i,t}^k(z)$  is output,  $Z_{i,t}^k(z)$  denotes variety-specific component of gross output productivity,  $L_{i,t}^k(z)$  is labor input, and  $M_{i,t}^{k,n}(z)$  is sector- $n$ 's good used as an intermediate input in the production of sector- $k$ 's good. Note that  $\{Y_{i,t}^k(z), Z_{i,t}^k(z), L_{i,t}^k(z), M_{i,t}^{k,n}(z)\}$  are all variety-sector-province-year specific.  $T_{i,t}^k$  governs the fundamental exogenous component of measured value-added productivity, namely production efficiency. The two production parameters,  $\lambda_{i,k}$  and  $\gamma_{i,k,n}$ , determine the value-added share and the share of intermediates from sector  $n$  in the production function, respectively. As in [Eaton and Kortum \(2002\)](#), we assume that, in every period, gross output productivity  $Z_{i,t}^k(z)$  is the realization of random efficiency drawn from a Fréchet distribution.:  $F(Z) = e^{-Z^{-\theta}}$ , where  $\theta > 1$  governs the within-region and sector variation in firms' productivity. A bigger  $\theta$  implies lower dispersion in productivity. Therefore, as in [Sposi \(2019\)](#), we can refer the measured gross output productivity  $A_{i,t}^k(z)$  as the composite  $Z_{i,t}^k(z) T_{i,t}^{\lambda_{i,k}}$ .

We assume the existence of iceberg costs in shipping goods and services to different regions. Shipping costs include tariffs, transportation costs, and other barriers to trade. In particular, we assume iceberg costs  $\tau_{i,j,t}^k$  for shipping good in sector  $k$  from region  $j$  to region  $i$ . As standard in the literature, we assume that the trade costs are zero within a region,  $\tau_{i,i,t}^g = \tau_{i,i,t}^{hs} = \tau_{i,i,t}^{ms} = \tau_{i,i,t}^{ls} = 1$ .

Markets are competitive. From the firms' cost minimization problem, subject to technology (3.1), the price of shipping good  $z$  in sector  $k$  from region  $i$  to region  $j$  is

$$p_{i,t}^k(z) = \frac{v_{i,t}^k \tau_{j,i,t}^k}{A_{i,t}^k(z)} = \frac{v_{i,t}^k \tau_{j,i,t}^k}{Z_{i,t}^k(z) T_{i,t}^{\lambda_{i,k}}}$$

where  $v_{i,t}^k$  is the unit cost of input bundle given by

$$v_{i,t}^k = \lambda_{i,k}^{(-\lambda_{i,k})} \left( \frac{\prod_{n=g,hs,ms,ls} \gamma_{i,k,n}^{-\gamma_{i,k,n}}}{1 - \lambda_{i,k}} \right) (w_{i,t})^{\lambda_{i,k}} \left( \prod_{n=g,hs,ms,ls} (P_{i,t}^n)^{\gamma_{i,k,n}} \right)^{1-\lambda_{i,k}} \quad (3.2)$$

where  $w_{i,t}$  is the wage and  $P_{i,t}^n$  is the price of sector- $n$ 's composite good.

In each sector  $k$ , competitive buyers buy good  $Q_{i,t}^k(z)$  either from a supplier within the region (region  $i$ ) or from one in the other region (region  $j$ ) whichever can offer a lower price,  $\hat{p}_{i,t}^k(z) = \min \{p_{i,j,t}^k(z)\}_{j=1}^{J+1}$ , where  $J+1$  is the total number of regions ( $J$  provinces and the RoW). Then, as in [Eaton and Kortum \(2002\)](#), under the Fréchet distribution assumption, the price of composite good  $k \in \{g, hs, ms, ls\}$  in region  $i$  is  $P_{i,t}^k = \Gamma (\Phi_{i,t}^k)^{-\frac{1}{\theta}}$ , where the constant  $\Gamma$  is the Gamma function evaluated at  $(1 - \frac{\eta-1}{\theta})^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}}$ , and  $\Phi_{i,t}^k = \sum_{j=1}^{J+1} (T_{j,t}^k)^{-\lambda_{i,k}} v_{j,t}^k \tau_{i,j,t}^k$ .<sup>17</sup> Thus,  $\Phi_{i,t}^k$  describes region  $i$ 's access to global production technologies in sector  $k$  scaled by the relevant unit costs for inputs and trade costs. For composite good in sector  $k \in \{g, hs, ms, ls\}$ , the price is

$$P_{i,t}^k = \Gamma \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{J+1} (T_{j,t}^k)^{-\lambda_{i,k}} v_{j,t}^k \tau_{i,j,t}^k \right]^{-\frac{1}{\theta}}. \quad (3.3)$$

Trade patterns in this model depend on the dispersion of productivities (comparative advantage) and trade barriers (geographic or economic). A lower value of  $\theta$  generates more room for comparative advantage, rather than trade barriers, in driving trade patterns. [Eaton and Kortum \(2002\)](#) show that, under the Fréchet distribution assumption, we can derive the share of region  $i$ 's expenditure on sector- $k$  goods from region  $j$ , as

$$\pi_{i,j,t}^k = \frac{(T_{j,t}^k)^{-\lambda_{i,k}} v_{j,t}^k \tau_{i,j,t}^k}{\Phi_{i,t}^k}^{-\theta}, \quad (3.4)$$

which equals the probability of importing sector- $k$  goods from region  $j$  in region  $i$ . Thus, region  $i$ 's share of imports in the total expenditure depends on region  $j$ 's average productivity in industry  $k$ , the cost of the input bundle, and trade costs to ship goods or services from region  $j$  to region  $i$ .

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<sup>17</sup>To ensure a well-defined price index, we assume  $\eta - 1 < \theta$  which is standard in the literature. Under this assumption, the parameter  $\eta$ , which governs the elasticity of substitution across goods within a sector, can be ignored because it appears only in the constant term  $\Gamma$ .

### 3.2 Household preferences

The representative household in region  $i$  at time  $t$  with non-homothetic CES preferences maximizes the aggregate per-capita consumption, which is implicitly defined as:

$$\sum_k \omega_k^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \left( \frac{C_{i,t}^k}{L_{i,t}} \right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \left( \frac{C_{i,t}}{L_{i,t}} \right)^{\frac{\epsilon_k - \sigma}{\sigma}} = 1. \quad (3.5)$$

where  $C_{i,t}^k$  is the real consumption of sector- $k$  composite goods;  $\omega_k$  denotes the relative weight of the consumption bundle in sector  $k$ ;  $\sigma$  is the price elasticity of substitution and  $\epsilon_k$  shapes the income elasticity of demand for sector  $k$ . Preference parameters are the same across regions.<sup>18</sup> This implicit utility function is also used in Sposi (2019), Lewis, Monarch, Sposi and Zhang (2020) and Comin, Lashkari and Mestieri (2021). Details are outlined in Appendix F.1. To ensure the monotonicity and quasi-concavity of aggregate utility  $C_{i,t}$ , we restrict income elasticity  $\epsilon_k > 0$  and either price elasticity (i)  $0 < \sigma < 1$  or (ii)  $\sigma > 1$ .

By setting  $k \in \{g, hs, ms, ls\}$  in (3.5), we can construct an aggregate real consumption,  $C_{i,t}$ , as a non-homothetic CES aggregator of real goods, high-tradable services, mid-tradable services and low-tradable services consumption,  $C_{i,t}^g$ ,  $C_{i,t}^{hs}$ ,  $C_{i,t}^{ms}$  and  $C_{i,t}^{ls}$ :

$$\frac{C_{i,t}}{L_{i,t}} = \left( \sum_k \omega_k^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \left( \frac{C_{i,t}}{L_{i,t}} \right)^{\frac{\epsilon_k - 1}{\sigma}} \left( \frac{C_{i,t}^k}{L_{i,t}} \right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}. \quad (3.6)$$

For  $\epsilon_k = 1$ , the nested utility function collapses into a standard CES utility with a homothetic demand function. By setting  $\sigma_k = \epsilon_k = 1$ , the representative household behaves with a Cobb-Douglas preference.

### 3.3 Budget constraint

The budget constraint of a representative household is

$$P_{i,t} C_{i,t} + (l_i^{Dom} + l_i^{Int}) w_{i,t} L_{i,t} = w_{i,t} L_{i,t} + (\xi^{Dom} + \xi^{Int}) L_{i,t}, \quad (3.7)$$

s.t.

$$\sum_{k \in \{g, hs, ms, ls\}} P_{i,t}^k C_{i,t}^k = P_{i,t} C_{i,t}, \quad (3.8)$$

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<sup>18</sup>When estimating the preference parameters in Section 4.1, we introduce region-fixed effects in the consumption expenditure share equations, which could be interpreted as heterogeneity in  $\{\omega_k\}$  across regions.

where  $C_{i,t}^k$  is the consumption of sector- $k$  composite goods for  $k \in \{g, hs, ms, ls\}$  in region  $i$  at time  $t$ ,  $w_{i,t}$  is the household's wage rate from supplying their unit labor inelastically, and  $P_{i,t}^k$  is the price of the sector- $k$  composite good. As in [Caliendo, Parro, Rossi-Hansberg and Sarte \(2017\)](#), the model measures trade imbalances as net payments from a portfolio. Specifically, we assume that in each period, a representative household in region  $i$  spends a fraction  $\iota_i^{Dom}$  and  $\iota_i^{Int}$  of income into national and global portfolios, respectively. Only households in Canada share the returns from national portfolios ( $\xi^{Dom}$ ), while returns from international portfolios ( $\xi^{Int}$ ) are equally distributed to households globally. Therefore, the net returns  $\iota_i^{Dom}w_{i,t}L_{i,t} - \xi^{Dom}L_{i,t}$  and  $\iota_i^{Int}w_{i,t}L_{i,t} - \xi^{Int}L_{i,t}$  govern trade imbalances that emerge from inter-provincial and international trade, which satisfy:

$$\sum_i \iota_i^{Dom} w_{i,t} L_{i,t} = \xi^{Dom} \sum_i L_{i,t}, \quad \forall i \in \{1, \dots, J\}; \quad (3.9)$$

$$\sum_i \iota_i^{Int} w_{i,t} L_{i,t} = \xi^{Int} \sum_i L_{i,t}, \quad \forall i \in \{1, \dots, J+1\}; \quad (3.10)$$

$\iota_i^{Dom}$  and  $\iota_i^{Int}$  are modeled as the ratio of domestic and international net exports to total value-added for region  $i$  in the baseline economy.<sup>19</sup> Given that net exports sum up to zero, the lump sum transfer  $\xi^{Dom}$  and  $\xi^{Int}$  will equal 0 in the benchmark. In counterfactual exercises,  $\xi^{Dom}$  and  $\xi^{Int}$  will absorb the aggregate trade imbalances caused by changes in trade costs.

### 3.4 Equilibrium

Within a region, we assume perfect competition for all the goods and factor markets. In particular, we assume labor is mobile across sectors but immobile across regions or countries.<sup>20</sup> Let  $L_{i,t}$  denote total labor endowment in region  $i$ , and  $L_{i,t}^k$  denote labor employed in sector  $k$ . Then, the following labor market clearing condition holds every period within the region

$$L_{i,t} = L_{i,t}^g + L_{i,t}^{hs} + L_{i,t}^{ms} + L_{i,t}^{ls}. \quad (3.11)$$

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<sup>19</sup>Therefore,  $\iota_i^{Dom}$  and  $\iota_i^{Int}$  can be negative in a region with trade deficit. [Caliendo, Parro, Rossi-Hansberg and Sarte \(2017\)](#) assumes a fraction of local rents ( $\iota_i \in [0, 1]$ ) is allocated to the national portfolio and then re-distributed. In a separate exercise, we tried imposing their assumption, restricting  $\iota_i^{Dom}$  and  $\iota_i^{Int}$  to values within the interval 0 and 1. The welfare results are robust to this adjustment.

<sup>20</sup>It would be interesting to see how the results change if the assumption of labor immobility across regions in the same country is relaxed. But we leave it for future research.

The goods and services markets also clear every period. For each sector  $k \in \{g, hs, ms, ls\}$ , we have

$$Q_{i,t}^k = C_{i,t}^k + \sum_{n=g,hs,ms,ls} (1 - \lambda_{i,n}) \gamma_{i,n,k} \sum_{j=1}^{J+1} \frac{\pi_{j,i,t}^n P_{j,t}^n Q_{j,t}^n}{P_{i,t}^k}. \quad (3.12)$$

The above equations relate to the total production of goods or services in sector  $k$ ,  $Q_{i,t}^k$ , to the sum of the quantity demanded for domestic final production,  $C_{i,t}^k$ , for the usage of intermediate inputs in the production of domestic tradable goods, high-tradable services, mid-tradable services and low-tradable services.

Given region-specific labor endowment  $\{L_{i,t}\}$ , trade costs  $\{\tau_{i,j,t}^g, \tau_{i,j,t}^{hs}, \tau_{i,j,t}^{ms}, \tau_{i,j,t}^{ls}\}$ , productivity process  $\{T_{i,t}^g, T_{i,t}^{hs}, T_{i,t}^{ms}, T_{i,t}^{ls}\}$ , and common structural parameters  $\{\sigma, \eta, \theta, \{\lambda_{i,k}\}, \{\gamma_{i,k,n}\}, \{\epsilon_k\}, \{\omega_k\}\}$ , a competitive equilibrium of the model is defined as follows.

**Definition 1.** *A competitive equilibrium is a sequence of goods and factor prices*

*$\{P_{i,t}^g, P_{i,t}^{hs}, P_{i,t}^{ms}, P_{i,t}^{ls}, w_{i,t}\}_{i \in J+1}$ , allocations  $\{L_{i,t}^g, L_{i,t}^{hs}, L_{i,t}^{ms}, L_{i,t}^{ls}, Q_{i,t}^g, Q_{i,t}^{hs}, Q_{i,t}^{ms}, Q_{i,t}^{ls}, C_{i,t}^g, C_{i,t}^{hs}, C_{i,t}^{ms}, C_{i,t}^{ls}\}_{i \in J+1}$  and trade shares  $\{\pi_{i,j,t}^g, \pi_{i,j,t}^{hs}, \pi_{i,j,t}^{ms}, \pi_{i,j,t}^{ls}\}_{i,j \in J+1}$  such that, given prices, the allocations solve the firms' maximization problems associated with technologies (3.1), an the household's maximization problem characterized by (3.6)-(3.8), and satisfy the market clearing conditions (3.11)-(3.12).*

## 4 Calibration

In this section, we calibrate and estimate the key parameters of the model. We assume that preference parameters are common across all provinces, while production coefficients are province-specific.

### 4.1 Preference parameters

We estimate sectoral expenditure shares' weights ( $\omega_k$ ), consumption elasticities ( $\sigma$ ), and income elasticities ( $\epsilon_k$ ) using the data on the final consumption expenditure in current and constant prices. We also use Canadian provincial employment data as labor demand  $L_{it}$ . Details of data construction are described in Appendix E.2.

We structurally estimate the elasticities of both income and price channels by minimizing the distance between the observed sectoral expenditures and those implied by the model, given the observed prices. Combining (3.6)–(3.8) and taking the first-order condition, we generate model-implied relative sectoral expenditure ratio between mid-tradable services and

each sector  $k \in \{g, hs, ls\}$  as:

$$\frac{P_{it}^{ms} C_{it}^{ms}}{P_{it}^k C_{it}^k} = \frac{\omega_{ms}}{\omega_k} \left( \frac{P_{it}^{ms}}{P_{it}^k} \right)^{1-\sigma} \left( \frac{C_{it}}{L_{it}} \right)^{\epsilon_{ms}-\epsilon_k}, \quad (4.1)$$

Equation (3.6) enables us to separate the relative price effect and income effect, respectively. We can estimate preference parameters by jointly minimizing two squared distances between model-implied sectoral expenditures ratio and those from the data:

$$\min_{\sigma, \epsilon_g, \epsilon_{hs}, \epsilon_{ls}} \sum_i \sum_t \sum_{k \in \{g, hs, ls\}} \left( \frac{\omega_{ms}}{\omega_k} \left( \frac{\widehat{P_{it}^{ms}}}{\widehat{P_{it}^k}} \right)^{1-\sigma} \left( \frac{C_{it}}{\widehat{L_{it}}} \right)^{\epsilon_{ms}-\epsilon_k} - \frac{\widehat{P_{it}^{ms} C_{it}^{ms}}}{\widehat{P_{it}^k C_{it}^k}} \right)^2, \quad (4.2)$$

s.t.

$$\omega_g + \omega_{hs} + \omega_{ms} + \omega_{ls} = 1, \quad (4.3)$$

$$\epsilon_{ms} = 1, \quad (4.4)$$

$$P_{it} \frac{C_{it}}{\widehat{L_{it}}} = \left( \sum_k \omega_k \left( \frac{C_{it}}{\widehat{L_{it}}} \right)^{\epsilon_k - \sigma} \widehat{P_{it}^k}^{1-\sigma} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}, \quad (4.5)$$

where “hat” denotes observations from the data. We impose the sum of relative weight  $\omega_k$  equal to 1 in Equation (4.3). Similar to Lewis, Monarch, Sposi and Zhang (2020), we adjust the value of  $\omega_k$  to the average expenditure share at the beginning of the sample. As  $\omega_k$  is identical across provinces, we introduce a province-fixed effect to make up for the deviation between provincial sectoral expenditure share and  $\omega_k$  in 1992. Provided that income elasticities are calibrated only in differences, we normalize  $\epsilon_{ms}$  to one, which is only a monotonic transformation of the utility function Comin, Lashkari and Mestieri (2021).

We estimate the parameters  $\{\epsilon_g, \epsilon_{hs}, \epsilon_{ls}, \sigma\}$  in Equation (4.2) with panel data for 11 Canadian provinces during the period 1992–2017, using the Non-Linear Least Squares. The estimation strategy goes as follows: (i) Give an initial guess to five preference parameters  $\{\epsilon_g, \epsilon_{hs}, \epsilon_{ls}, \sigma\}$ ; (ii) We then feed Equation (4.5) with data on aggregate expenditure, sectoral price and total employment. (iii) The aggregate expenditure,  $P_{it} C_{it}$ , becomes a non-linear function with only one unknown,  $C_{it}$ ; Provided that total expenditure is strictly increasing with  $C_{it}$ , we can solve out  $C_{it}$  in a one-to-one mapping. (iv) Then, update parameters values  $\{\epsilon_g, \epsilon_{hs}, \epsilon_{ls}, \sigma\}$  by minimising the deviation in equation (4.2). (vii) We go back to step (ii) with updated parameters and keep repeating the procedure until the objective function reaches its global minimum value.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>21</sup>Note that our estimation considers an error term at the region-sector-time level. This error term

TABLE 4 – Preference parameters values

Preference parameters		Estimates	S.E.
$\omega_g$	Relative weight for goods	0.34	-
$\omega_{ms}$	Relative weight for mid-tradable services	0.29	-
$\omega_{hs}$	Relative weight for high-tradable services	0.32	-
$\epsilon_g$	Income elasticity on Goods	0.47	[0.39,0.54]
$\epsilon_{ls}$	Income elasticity on low-tradable services	1.46	[1.38,1.53]
$\epsilon_{ms}$	Income elasticity on mid-tradable services	1.00	-
$\epsilon_{hs}$	Income elasticity on high-tradable services	1.10	[1.05,1.15]
$\sigma$	Price elasticity across sectors	0.69	[0.58,0.76]

Notes: We compute standard errors by bootstrapping the same number of province-time observations with replacement. We apply the calibration procedure to the simulated data in each replication and record the value of calibrated preference parameters for 1000 repetitions.

Table 4 reports our estimated preference parameters, which satisfy the basic regularity conditions, including monotonicity and quasi-concavity, given  $\epsilon > 0$  and  $\sigma \neq 1$  across all sectors. The demand elasticities for goods and services is qualitatively consistent with prior literature. The price elasticity estimate ( $\sigma = 0.69$ ) indicates a complementary relationship among sectoral expenditures, while the income elasticity ( $\epsilon_g = 0.47 < 1$ ) suggests that goods are necessities compared to all types of services.<sup>22</sup> These differences between goods and service sectors are critical to understanding how changes in relative prices and income, induced by changes in barriers to trade, affect sectoral VA shares in the economy.

Within the services sector, we observe heterogeneity in income elasticities, consistent with findings from prior studies (e.g., Duarte and Restuccia, 2019; Cravino and Sotelo, 2019; Duernecker, Herrendorf and Valentinyi, 2023; Lee, 2023). Our results indicate that low-tradable services exhibit the highest income elasticity, while mid-tradable services are less income-elastic within the services sector. Specifically, our estimate of  $\epsilon_{ls} = 1.46$  suggests that low-tradable services, such as private schools and private hospitals, are considered luxuries

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captures, for example, sector-region-specific demand shocks that shift consumer expenditure shares.

<sup>22</sup>These estimates are consistent with studies using similar sectoral classification strategies. For example, Cravino and Sotelo (2019), using U.S. national data from 1977–2012, report a price elasticity of 0.58 and find that skill-intensive and non-skill-intensive services are more income-elastic than goods (1.82 and 1.42 relative to 1). Similarly, Lee (2023), using data from 66 countries spanning 1995–2018, estimate a substitution elasticity of 0.52 and report higher income elasticities for producer and consumer services than goods (1.65 and 1.42 relative to 1).

relative to high-tradable services, including wholesale and transportation. This finding is consistent with [Duernecker, Herrendorf and Valentinyi \(2023\)](#), where education and health care, categorized as stagnant services, are also identified as luxuries.<sup>23</sup> Meanwhile, mid-tradable services are estimated to have the lowest income elasticity within the services sector. This result is largely attributed to the significant proportion of real estate and rental services in mid-tradable services.

Figure 3 shows the model fit for consumption shares. The upper-left panel shows the calibrated consumption expenditure share in the goods sector from the model and the data. The calibration aligns closely with the observations, as data points are tightly clustered around the 45° line. The upper-right panel illustrates the model fit for consumption expenditure shares in high-tradable services. Notable deviations are observed in British Columbia and Northwest Territories & Nunavut, where the high-tradable services share does not exhibit a linear increase over time, different from in other provinces. This discrepancy arises because our model, which assumes regionally homogeneous preference parameters, generates an increasing trend in high-tradable services consumption shares, leading to measurement noise for these provinces. A similar explanation applies to the deviations observed in mid-tradable services. The lower-right panel indicates that our model aligns well with the data for consumption shares in low-tradable services.

We check the robustness of our calibration by examining the model fit for untargeted moments, focusing specifically on sectoral prices. Using the calibrated preference parameters, we compute the model-implied sectoral prices for each province by leveraging the constructed observed aggregate price and real consumption in Equations 4.2 and 4.5.<sup>24</sup> Figure 4 indicates that our model-implied sectoral prices achieve the goal well, particularly for mid-tradable services. The correlations between the model-implied and observed sectoral prices are 0.74, 0.86, 0.93, and 0.80 for goods, high-tradable services, mid-tradable services, and low-tradable services, respectively. Overall, the model closely matches variables that were not directly targeted in the calibration.

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<sup>23</sup>For further evidence on the high-income elasticity of low-tradables such as health care and education services, see [Aguilar and Bills \(2015\)](#) and [Lee, Oh and Meng \(2019\)](#).

<sup>24</sup>The process involves three steps: (i) Constructing nominal and real aggregate consumption following the approach outlined in Appendix E.2. (ii) Defining the observed aggregate price as the ratio of nominal to real aggregate consumption, adjusting the price level in the CGDC Productivity database to ensure comparability across sectors. (iii) Using the constructed aggregate price and real consumption data, along with observed consumption expenditure shares, in Equations 4.2 and 4.5 to solve for the four unknown sectoral prices.




FIGURE 3 – Model fit for consumption shares

## 4.2 Production parameters

We calibrate production parameters  $\{\lambda_{i,k}, \gamma_{i,k,n}\}$  using Canadian input-output tables at the provincial level. From firms' maximizing conditions, under Cobb-Douglas technologies, the production parameters have a direct empirical counterpart. Given that production technology can change over time, we allow these parameters to change with the data.

Formally,  $\lambda_{i,k}$  denotes the ratio of nominal value-added to gross output and  $\gamma_{i,k,n}$  measures the share of sector  $n$  goods on intermediate inputs for the production in sector  $k$ . Due to the data limitation, provincial input-output tables are available only over 2009–2011 and 2014–2017 annually. We impute production parameters in the missing years using the average  $\lambda_{i,k}$  and  $\gamma_{i,k,n}$  over the above period for each province. This is feasible as the time-series variation




FIGURE 4 – Model fit for untargeted sectoral prices

within each province is negligible.<sup>25</sup>

Mean values of production parameters as well as their maximum and minimum are reported in Table A.4. There is huge heterogeneity in production shares across provinces, especially for  $\lambda_{i,g}$ , where New Brunswick uses goods intermediates more intensively, indicated by  $\lambda_{i,g} = 0.27$ . We find that those provinces with a higher value-added share in the good sector generally have a higher  $\lambda_{i,g}$  than other services-intensive provinces. Furthermore, those goods-intensive provinces utilize more services to produce goods, with a higher  $\gamma_{i,g,hs}$  than services-intensive provinces. As in Sposi (2019) and Lewis, Monarch, Sposi and Zhang

<sup>25</sup>In Appendix B.1, we assume the values of  $\{\lambda_{i,k}, \gamma_{i,k,n}\}$  are constant over time, using the average values of them over 2009–2011 and 2014–2017 for each province. The main results in the counterfactual exercises didn't change much.

(2020), goods production sources itself as intermediate more intensively while services production is more service-intensive, which holds for all provinces. Consistent with [Simonovska and Waugh \(2014\)](#), we set trade elasticity  $\theta = 4$  for all sectors.  $\eta = 4$  in our paper to ensure that Gamma function  $\Gamma$  evaluates in the positive domain.

### 4.3 Production efficiency and trade costs

Production efficiency  $T_{i,t}^k$  and trade costs  $\tau_{i,j,t}^k$  are calibrated using the bilateral trade flows and sectoral prices. We impute technology  $T_{i,t}^k$  from measured productivity  $A_{i,t}^k$ , where  $A_{i,t}^k$  is the average realization of random efficiency drawn from a Fréchet distribution. We measure productivity as the ratio of the cost of the input bundle to the sectoral price, and is given by:

$$A_{i,t}^k = v_{i,t}^k / P_{i,t}^k \quad (4.6)$$

Equation 4.6 implies the quantitative link among input cost, sectoral price, and measured productivity: either two terms are sufficient statistics for the third. For a given cost of the input bundle, a lower price of the composite good indicates a higher measured productivity. Combined with the input cost specification in Equation 3.2, we can rewrite measured productivity as a function of sectoral price:

$$A_{i,t}^k = \left( \frac{1}{\lambda_{i,k}} \right)^{\lambda_{i,k}} \frac{w_{i,t}}{P_{i,t}^k} \left( \prod_{n \in \{g,ls,ms,hs\}} \left( \frac{P_{i,t}^n}{w_{i,t} \gamma_{i,k,n} (1 - \lambda_{i,k})} \right)^{\gamma_{i,k,n}} \right)^{1 - \lambda_{i,k}}. \quad (4.7)$$

As in [Święcki \(2017\)](#) and [Sposi \(2019\)](#), we make use of Equation 4.7 and construct measured productivity given sectoral prices.<sup>26</sup> The next step is to adjust for the Ricardian selection effect and recover  $T_{i,t}^k$ . Holding the state of technology constant, trade openness increases average productivity ([Finicelli, Pagano and Sbracia \(2013\)](#)). Thus, we map fundamental technology  $T_{i,t}^k$  from measured gross output productivity  $A_{i,t}^k$  using

$$A_{i,t}^k = \Gamma^{-1} \left( T_{i,t}^k \right)^{\lambda_k} \left( \pi_{i,i,t}^k \right)^{\frac{-1}{\theta}}, \quad (4.8)$$

where  $\pi_{i,i,t}^k$  denotes province  $i$ 's absorption ratio in sector  $k$ , which equals to 1 in a closed economy.

To calibrate trade costs, we target the observed sequence import shares in the data.

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<sup>26</sup>While our measured productivity does not explicitly consider demand shocks, the fact that we use data on sectoral prices, input bundle cost, and wages at the regional level, implicitly accounts for regional demand.

Combining equations 3.3 and 3.4, we can solve for trade cost as a function of relative import shares and relative sectoral prices:

$$\tau_{i,j,t}^k = \left( \frac{\pi_{i,j,t}^k}{\pi_{j,j,t}^k} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\theta}} \left( \frac{P_{i,t}^k}{P_{j,t}^k} \right). \quad (4.9)$$

We use Equation 4.9 to back out trade costs  $\{\tau_{i,j,t}^k\}$ , at every period, such that the model implied import shares  $\{\pi_{i,j,t}^k\}$ , given prices, exactly match the observed import shares  $\{\hat{\pi}_{i,j,t}^k\}$ .

## 4.4 Measurement

In this section, we describe our approach to measuring model-implied net exports and value-added shares in a way they are internally consistent.

### 4.4.1 Net exports construction

To measure model-implied sectoral net exports, we require data on consumption expenditure, input-output coefficients and the import expenditure share  $\pi_{i,j,t}^k$ , where  $k \in \{g, ls, ms, hs\}$ .<sup>27</sup> Figure 5 depicts the model fit of the sectoral net export share, which is measured by the ratio of sectoral net exports to total value-added for each province. The reasons why the benchmark model closely matches the net export share data are twofold. First, the model import expenditure share  $\pi_{i,j,t}^k$  is calibrated to match exactly that from the data. Second, our estimated demand system generates model-implied sectoral consumption expenditure that fits the data quite well (Figure 3).

### 4.4.2 Value-added construction

As in Uy, Yi and Zhang (2013), we obtain model-implied sectoral value-added using Equation 4.10.<sup>28</sup> This equation expresses the sectoral value as a function of the sectoral expenditure  $E_{i,t}^k$  and net exports  $NX_{i,t}^k$ . Given that expenditure and net exports are expressed in gross-output terms, Equation 4.10 properly weights them by provincial input-output coefficients (value-added content).

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<sup>27</sup>Formally, we take the following steps: We solve for sectoral total absorption  $P_{i,t}^k Q_{i,t}^k$  using the production equilibrium equations 3.10 and F.16 in Appendix F.3 along with data on sectoral consumption expenditure. We then compute the model-implied net exports from Equation F.12 in Appendix F.3, using data on import shares  $\pi_{i,j,t}^k$ .

<sup>28</sup>Details of the proof are shown in Appendix F.3.




FIGURE 5 – Model fit for sectoral net export shares

Note that the sectoral expenditure  $E_{i,t}^k$  refers to final absorption, which includes consumption expenditure  $P_{i,t}^k C_{i,t}^k$ , investment  $I_{i,t}^k$  and government spending  $G_{i,t}^k$ . The expenditure-based Canadian GDP data from Statistics Canada provides us with the investment and government spending data at the aggregate level. To construct a time series of sectoral investment and government spending at the regional level, we combine the aggregate data for the period 1992–2017 with the sectoral investment and government spending shares from annual provincial input-output tables. While there is significant cross-province variation in the sectoral share of investment and government spending, time variation within a province is very mild. Therefore, we use the average province-sector investment/government shares to construct a time series of sectoral investment and government spending measures, at the province level, that are consistent with the aggregate data. Hence, we obtain the model-implied sectoral value-added for each province using

$$\begin{bmatrix} VA_{i,t}^g \\ VA_{i,t}^{ls} \\ VA_{i,t}^{ms} \\ VA_{i,t}^{hs} \end{bmatrix} = \Omega^{-1} \begin{bmatrix} E_{i,t}^g \\ E_{i,t}^{ls} \\ E_{i,t}^{ms} \\ E_{i,t}^{hs} \end{bmatrix} + \Omega^{-1} \begin{bmatrix} NX_{i,t}^g \\ NX_{i,t}^{ls} \\ NX_{i,t}^{ms} \\ NX_{i,t}^{hs} \end{bmatrix}, \quad (4.10)$$

where

$$E_{i,t}^k = P_{i,t}^k C_{i,t}^k + I_{i,t}^k + G_{i,t}^k, \quad k \in \{g, ls, ms, hs\}.$$

Equation 4.10 underlines two channels through which trade matters for regional specialization. First, the consumption expenditure channel. Trade alters relative prices and income. The selection effect of trade openness enhances average productivity in tradable sectors, which in turn lowers tradable sector prices. Trade also raises real income as regions face lower prices while also specializing in the sectors they have a comparative advantage. Given that price and income elasticities in our calibration are significantly different from 1, opening to trade changes sectoral consumption expenditure shares through price and income effects. Second, trade affects regional value-added shares directly through the net export channel. When a province experiences a trade surplus in its comparative advantage sector(s), workers move towards that sector(s), which then shapes employment shares and, therefore, value-added shares.

## 5 Counterfactual experiments

In this section, we conduct a set of counterfactual exercises to examine the role of domestic and international trade in services in shaping regional specialization, structural transformation, and welfare across Canadian provinces. We sequentially eliminate domestic and international trade and analyze their effects. Our exercise can be interpreted as an increase in the cost of exporting services due to regulatory constraints or the absence of digital technologies that enable remote service provision.

### 5.1 Counterfactual strategy

Our counterfactual strategy follows Alvarez and Lucas (2007) and Lewis, Monarch, Sposi and Zhang (2020). The strategy involves setting the trade cost to an immense value so that there are no exports of service  $k$  from province  $j$  to province  $i$ . We start iteration with an initial guess to the provincial wage  $w_i$ . We compute sectoral price, input cost, import share, real income, and gross output subsequently and update  $w_i$ . A new general equilibrium is then solved with these new trade costs, keeping production and household preferences parameters the same as in the benchmark economy. Details of the counterfactual strategy can be found in Appendix F.4.

## 5.2 Service trade and regional specialization

Here we study the role of domestic and international services trade in shaping Canadian regional specialization in services. We first set the domestic service trade cost to  $10^6$  for all the service sectors, and analyze its effects on the economy of each Canadian province. We do the same exercise for international service trade, second. Corresponding results for each sub-service sector are reported in Appendix C.1.

### Domestic service trade

Table 5 summarizes the cross-sectional percentage change on different value-added components by switching off domestic service trade. We compute the percentage change on aggregate real consumption  $C$ , relative prices  $P_{hs}/P_{ms}$ ,  $P_{hs}/P_{ls}$ , and  $P_{hs}/P_g$ , the consumption share of services  $PC_S/PC$ , an international net export share  $NX_S/VA$ , and the value-added share of services  $VA_S/VA$  for each year each province respectively and report time-averaging results in each column. Hence, the first six columns reflect the income effect, the price effect, and the net export channels, while the last column, value-added share, reflects the resulting effect through these three channels.

Column 1 of Table 5 shows that, absent domestic service trade, real income shrinks for all Canadian provinces. This result confirms the results in Frankel and Romer (1999) and Irwin and Terviö (2002) in which trade has a quantitatively large and robust positive effect on income. Through non-homotheticities in demand, the decline in real income generates a decline in the consumption share of services, which are luxuries compared to goods. Note that, within the service sector, low-tradable services are luxuries relative to other services. Hence, the reallocation of demand from low-tradable services to mid- and high-tradable services mitigates the negative income effect on consumption expenditures for mid- and high-tradable services.

In Columns 2–4 of Table 5, we show that the prices of high-tradable services relative to mid- and low-tradable services and goods rise in all provinces, which is natural since, in the absence of domestic trade, there is limited production specialization across regions. Hence, in the presence of complementarities in consumption previously shown in Table 4, the consumption share of high-tradable services increases. The implications for consumption expenditure shares show that the negative income effect and the positive price effect cancel each other. Indeed, the net effect on services consumption expenditure in Column 5 is small and depends on the strength of the income and the price effects. In general, relatively large provinces with greater high-tradable service productivities (such as Ontario, Quebec, and

TABLE 5 – Percent change (%) on different channels with absence of domestic service trade

Average change (%) over 1992-2017	No Domestic Services Trade						
	$C$ (1)	$P_{hs}/P_{ms}$ (2)	$P_{hs}/P_{ls}$ (3)	$P_{hs}/P_g$ (4)	$PC_S/PC$ (5)	$NX_S/VA$ (6)	$VA_S/VA$ (7)
<b>Canadian Provinces</b>							
Alberta	-6.6	2.2	5.9	5.9	-0.8	2.0	2.0
British Columbia	-5.4	2.6	4.9	4.7	-0.7	0.7	0.2
Northwest Territories & Nunavut	-26.8	21.4	28.8	33.6	-4.4	14.9	15.2
Manitoba	-9.9	4.6	9.1	8.1	-1.5	-0.2	-0.7
New Brunswick	-9.3	6.1	11.0	13.5	-1.0	6.7	5.3
Newfoundland and Labrador	-9.8	7.8	13.9	16.8	-1.0	11.2	14.5
Nova Scotia	-7.5	6.5	9.9	11.8	-0.8	5.8	4.1
Ontario	-5.3	2.2	3.3	1.1	-1.0	-4.3	-4.3
Prince Edward Island	-10.6	9.9	14.6	18.5	-1.1	9.6	7.8
Quebec	-5.5	2.0	4.7	4.5	-0.8	0.6	0.2
Saskatchewan	-10.7	6.1	12.2	14.0	-1.2	8.1	9.9

Notes: Each column reports the average percent deviation, for the period 1992–2017, in the no domestic service trade economy, compared to the benchmark economy.

British Columbia) have stable prices for services when domestic service trade is closed. Thus, the income effect dominates and dampens the consumption expenditure share in services in these wealthier provinces.

Column 6 of Table 5 presents the changes in the net exports of services when domestic service trade is absent. Ontario, the sole net exporter of domestic services, experiences a decrease in its net export, while almost all other provinces have varying degrees of increase. These changes, combined with the impacts on consumption expenditure shares, lead to diverse effects on the value-added shares of services. In general, the share of net exports in GDP decreases in a province that is a net domestic exporter of services (e.g. Ontario). This effect, combined with a further income effect, significantly reduces the value-added share of services. Conversely, in the majority of provinces that are net importers of services, net exports of services increase, which, combined with the price effect, increases the value-added share of services.

TABLE 6 – Percentage change (%) on different channels with absence of international service trade

Average change (%) over 1992-2017	No International Services Trade						
	$C$ (1)	$P_{hs}/P_{ms}$ (2)	$P_{hs}/P_{ts}$ (3)	$P_{hs}/P_g$ (4)	$PC_S/PC$ (5)	$NX_S/VA$ (6)	$VA_S/VA$ (7)
<b>Canadian Provinces</b>							
Alberta	-2.3	1.0	1.8	1.2	-0.4	-2.8	-3.2
British Columbia	-3.5	1.6	2.5	1.0	-0.6	-3.4	-3.4
Northwest Territories & Nunavut	-3.6	2.0	2.3	1.9	-0.7	-2.9	-4.2
Manitoba	-2.9	1.6	2.3	1.6	-0.5	-2.2	-2.2
New Brunswick	-3.5	1.3	2.1	0.3	-0.8	-3.7	-3.8
Newfoundland and Labrador	-1.9	0.8	1.4	0.8	-0.4	-2.9	-4.1
Nova Scotia	-2.8	1.3	1.9	0.6	-0.6	-2.0	-2.2
Ontario	-4.3	1.5	3.0	2.2	-0.7	-1.7	-1.7
Prince Edward Island	-2.4	0.8	1.6	0.4	-0.5	-3.3	-3.0
Quebec	-3.2	0.8	2.1	1.3	-0.6	-2.2	-2.3
Saskatchewan	-2.7	1.0	1.9	1.1	-0.5	-4.5	-5.6

Notes: Each column reports the average percentage change for no international service trade model over 1992–2017 for each province by comparing with the benchmark.

### International service trade

Table 6 illustrates the impact of the absence of international service trade on real income, relative price, consumption expenditure share, net export, and value-added share. Similar to the results in the no domestic service trade exercise, prohibition in international service trade dampens real income  $C$  and results in a negative income effect on services consumption expenditure for all provinces, as shown in Column 1. Compared with the absent domestic service trade counterpart in Table 5, the absence of international service trade triggers uniform changes in real income. This is due to the lack of heterogeneity in the international service trade share. Thus, absence of international service trade, most provinces lose their real income similarly. In addition, a higher high-tradable service price raises the relative price and brings about a positive price effect due to the complementarity, as shown in Columns 2–4. This effect is relatively minor and uniform across Canadian provinces, as Canadian provinces all have a comparative advantage in service production relative to the rest of the world. As the force from the price effect becomes much weaker, the income effect outweighs




FIGURE 6 – Average percentage change (%) in the service VA share with absent domestic and international service trade

and dominates in shaping the consumption expenditure on services. Hence, all Canadian provinces shift economic activities away from the service sectors, which leads to a lower consumption expenditure share of services.

Furthermore, unlike domestic service trade, all Canadian provinces gain a trade surplus from international service trade. By switching off the international service trade flows, the service net export share, therefore, drops for all provinces (Column 6). Both the consumption expenditure channel and the net export channel have negative effects, causing a decline in the share of value-added from services for all provinces (Column 7). For provinces with higher international service export to the value-added ratio (i.e. Saskatchewan, New Brunswick), the decrease in services value-added share is relatively stronger. On the other hand, the reduction in value-added in northern Canada is mainly attributed to the shrinkage in the consumption expenditure share through the income effect channel. Although there are these minor variations among provinces, the absence of international service trade generally leads to a decrease in the value-added share of services.

Figure 6 visually summarises the average percentage change in the service value-added share in the counterfactual exercise with no domestic services trade (the left figure) and in the exercise with no international services trade (the right figure). It can be seen that domestic service trade has heterogeneous impacts on the sectoral value-added share of the provinces, while international trade has relatively homogeneous impacts. Notably, whether the impact of service trade is heterogeneous or homogeneous is closely related to how service

trade affects the welfare of each province. The next section analyzes this point in more detail.

### 5.3 Service trade and welfare

In this section, we analyze how domestic and international service trade affects welfare. We measure welfare using the real wage from the baseline to the counterfactual model. Thus the welfare gains from service trade can be defined as  $1 - \frac{w'_i/P'_i}{w_i/P_i}$ , where  $w'_i$  and  $P'_i$  denotes the nominal wage and aggregate price by shutting down trade flows. Due to concerns that the real consumption level is subject to the choice of base sector within a non-homothetic preference framework, we revisited the welfare assessment in Appendix section D using the Equivalent Variation. The welfare outcomes remain robust. This formulation allows for a meaningful comparison of welfare gains from service trade with those from good trade, at both inter-provincial and international levels. Corresponding welfare gains from each service sub-sector are reported in Appendix C.2.

#### Domestic service trade

The average welfare gains from domestic service trade are shown in Column 1 of Table 7. All provinces experience welfare gains above 5%, with the national average welfare gains equal to 6%. The comparison of the first and second columns in the table reveals that the welfare gains through domestic service trade are comparable to those of domestic good trade. Furthermore, there is huge heterogeneity across regions regarding welfare gains through domestic service trade. The standard deviation of welfare gain from domestic services is higher than that of domestic good trade and international service trade.

To understand the source of heterogeneous welfare gains, we examine the factors contributing to this heterogeneity in welfare gains. We follow Di Giovanni, Levchenko and Zhang (2014) and plot welfare gains against the degree of specialization (Figure 7). The figure reveals a strong positive correlation between welfare gains and both the service imports and exports to GDP ratio. This implies that the extent of the welfare gains is closely related to that of regional specializations. We also note that imports have a higher correlation than exports. An example of this case is Northwest Territories, which heavily relies on domestic service imports. As seen in Section 5.2, domestic service trade has heterogeneous impacts on the industrial structures of provinces, which also leads to significant heterogeneity in welfare gains across provinces.

As highlighted in the last row of Table 7, domestic service trade plays a significant role

TABLE 7 – Welfare gains from domestic and international trade

Provinces	Domestic Trade		International Trade	
	Goods	Services	Goods	Services
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Alberta	0.05	0.07	0.08	0.02
British Columbia	0.05	0.05	0.10	0.04
Northwest Territories including Nunavut	0.09	0.27	0.11	0.04
Manitoba	0.10	0.10	0.11	0.03
New Brunswick	0.11	0.09	0.19	0.04
Newfoundland and Labrador	0.06	0.10	0.08	0.02
Nova Scotia	0.08	0.07	0.11	0.03
Ontario	0.05	0.05	0.21	0.04
Prince Edward Island	0.10	0.10	0.07	0.02
Quebec	0.06	0.05	0.15	0.03
Saskatchewan	0.08	0.11	0.10	0.03
Average welfare gain	0.06	0.06	0.16	0.04
S.D. of welfare gain	0.02	0.06	0.05	0.01
Change in S.D. of log real wage	-0.07	-0.19	-0.13	-0.02

Notes: The results in each column are obtained by comparing the benchmark and the counterfactual where domestic or international trade in services or goods is absent. The first 11 rows report the change in welfare for each province. The 12th row shows the average welfare gain, which is the weighted average of each province’s change in welfare, where the number of the labor force in each province is used for the weight. The 13th row shows the standard deviation of the change in welfare across provinces. The last row shows the change in the standard deviation of log real wage across provinces. The weights were not applied for the standard deviation calculations in order to highlight regional heterogeneity.

in decreasing real wage disparities in Canada. While the volume of domestic service trade is comparable to that of domestic good trade and one-third of international good trade (Table B.7), when it comes to reducing regional disparities, the impact of domestic service trade is much greater. The reason stems from the distribution of comparative advantage across Canadian provinces. Those poor provinces are the ones with comparative disadvantages in tradable services production. The presence of service trade, especially domestic trade, reduces the price of high-tradable services more for these provinces. This fact is evident from the relative price changes seen in Columns 2–4 of Table 5, in which smaller provinces, such as Northwest Territories & Nunavut and Prince Edward Island, experience large rises in the relative price of high-tradable services when domestic trade in services is absent. As a whole Canada, domestic service trade reduces the standard deviation of log real wages across




FIGURE 7 – Scatter plot of average welfare gains from domestic service trade against import (IM) or export (EX) shares

provinces by 19% as shown in Table 7.<sup>2930</sup>


### International service trade

Column 3 of Table 7 presents the welfare gains resulting from international service trade. Similar to domestic service trade, all provinces experience positive welfare gains from international service trade, but at a smaller magnitude of around 4%. While welfare gains from domestic service trade are comparable to those from good trade, welfare gains through international service trade only amount to one-third of the gains obtained from good trade. In addition, in contrast to domestic service trade, welfare gains from international service trade exhibit a more uniform distribution across regions. The standard deviation is significantly smaller compared to both good trade and domestic service trade. This is closely related to the fact that international service trade has uniform impacts on regional specialization, as discussed in Section 5.2.


Once again, we plot the welfare gains from international service trade against the degree of specialization in Figure 8. The figure demonstrates a similar positive correlation between welfare gains and the share of international service trade, although the welfare gains are much smaller than those of domestic service trade. This can be attributed to the fact that

<sup>29</sup>Our finding that smaller provinces benefit more from trade is analogous to that in Eaton and Kortum (2002) that smaller countries benefit more from trade.

<sup>30</sup>We also compute the top-bottom wage differentials across provinces to check the robustness of the result. The top-bottom wage differentials are reduced by 25% with domestic service trade.



(A) Import share



(B) Export share

FIGURE 8 – Scatter plot of average welfare gains from international service trade against import (IM) or export (EX) shares

the volume of international service trade flows is lower than that of domestic service trade, as seen in Table 1 previously.

## 5.4 Service trade and structural transformation in Canada


In this section, we analyze how service trade affected the structural transformation of the Canadian economy. We show that, despite the great impacts on regional specialization, domestic and international service trade had little effect on the trend of sectoral value-added shares in Canada during the period 1992–2017.<sup>31</sup>

### Domestic service trade


We study the effect of domestic service trade in shaping the pattern of structural transformation. The left panel of Figure 9 compares the trend of sectoral value-added share in the absence of domestic service trade with the baseline pattern. Notably, we observe a minor impact on domestic service trade, with a slight decrease in the high-tradable service value-added share.

Why does domestic trade have significant impacts neither on the trend nor the level of sectoral value-added shares? The main reason is that, when domestic service trade is

<sup>31</sup>During this period, we observe only a mild reallocation of sectoral activity in Canada. The value-added share of services in Canada increased from 68% in 1992 to 71% in 2017.



(A) No domestic service trade



(B) No international service trade

FIGURE 9 – Sectoral VA share with absent domestic and international service trade

absent, we observe a negative income effect resulting from non-homothetic CES preference and a positive price and net export effects resulting from less specialization across provinces on tradable service share. Although there is heterogeneity across provinces as to which of these three forces is stronger, when aggregated for Canada as a whole, they cancel out. In Appendix A, we conduct further analysis to break down the mechanism into the income effect and price effect. Figure A.3 in Appendix A illustrates the relationship between the benchmark sectoral value-added share and the contributions of trade-induced price effect and income effect separately.

### International service trade

The right panel of Figure 9 demonstrates the impact of international service trade on the structural transformation pattern. In contrast to domestic service trade, international service trade substantially contributes to the level of the service value-added share. However, its effect on the trend of value-added shares is rather small. In particular, absent international service trade, Canadian high-tradable services value-added share would have increased by 1.5 percentage points instead of 2.2 percentage points.

International service trade contributes to the increase of the service value-added share through two channels: the consumption expenditure channel and the net export channel. Figure A.4 in Appendix A illustrates the relative importance of these two channels by comparing the relative value-added change with the benchmark model. The figure indicates that international service trade impacts the value-added share primarily through the net export

channel. Unlike domestic service trade, all provinces in Canada act as net exporters regarding international service, generating a relatively strong effect through the net export channel, while the consumption expenditure channel only mildly impacts the value-added share.

## 6 Conclusion

In this paper, we show that service trade has important implications for regional production specialization and welfare. We use unique Canadian data on domestic and international trade in goods and services to show that: First, trade in services, especially domestic trade, is comparable to trade in goods. Second, there is significant regional specialization in the production of services across provinces. And, third, provinces with a greater service net exports to GDP ratio display a larger value-added share of services.

Based on these empirical findings, we study the impact of domestic and international trade in services on regional specialization and welfare, using a multi-regional, multi-sector model with non-homothetic preferences. We show that the impact of trade in services is significant. In particular, the effects of domestic trade in services on welfare are as important as those of domestic trade in goods. We also find that regional welfare gains from trade in services are much more heterogeneous than those from trade in goods. Our results highlight that domestic service trade can mitigate regional disparities by allowing smaller and relatively less productive provinces to access cheaper tradable services and to specialize in their comparatively-advantaged sector. We believe that these findings have important implications for the discussions on regional wage disparities and redistribution policies across regions.

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# Online Appendix

## A Additional figures and tables

TABLE A.1 – Service Exports Destinations

	To Alberta	To BC	To Manitoba	To NB	To NL	To NT	To NS	To Ontario	To PEI	To Quebec	To Saskatchewan	To Yukon	To ROW
From Alberta		13.67%	4.40%	0.97%	1.23%	1.33%	1.01%	22.81%	0.15%	5.82%	8.08%	0.32%	40.22%
From British Columbia	16.54%		1.99%	0.67%	0.43%	0.85%	0.77%	17.53%	0.16%	5.73%	2.56%	0.42%	52.36%
From Manitoba	11.83%	8.49%		0.57%	0.46%	0.53%	0.69%	27.29%	0.12%	7.50%	8.50%	0.12%	33.89%
From New Brunswick	6.96%	4.19%	1.77%		6.34%	0.09%	11.05%	15.06%	2.79%	18.52%	0.93%	0.03%	32.27%
From Newfoundland and Labrador	6.95%	3.61%	0.72%	6.05%		0.61%	8.84%	21.04%	1.91%	10.84%	1.43%	0.11%	37.90%
From Northwest Territories	17.43%	8.79%	2.03%	0.64%	1.71%		1.89%	26.01%	0.24%	12.32%	3.20%	1.19%	24.55%
From Nova Scotia	4.84%	2.95%	1.14%	8.43%	6.50%	0.19%		24.04%	2.65%	10.51%	1.39%	0.03%	37.31%
From Ontario	14.49%	11.30%	3.26%	2.15%	1.65%	0.49%	2.76%		0.42%	16.98%	3.42%	0.12%	42.96%
From Prince Edward Island	1.67%	1.59%	0.52%	11.14%	3.81%	0.27%	12.90%	16.12%		8.57%	0.44%	0.04%	42.95%
From Quebec	7.50%	5.82%	1.63%	2.68%	1.35%	0.35%	1.80%	28.03%	0.33%		1.80%	0.07%	48.64%
From Saskatchewan	17.85%	5.50%	6.29%	0.41%	0.18%	0.36%	0.51%	22.78%	0.11%	4.21%		0.07%	41.74%
From Yukon	12.70%	21.89%	1.97%	0.86%	0.67%	6.22%	1.42%	21.62%	0.19%	5.92%	2.67%		23.87%
Mean	10.80%	7.98%	2.34%	3.14%	2.21%	1.03%	3.97%	22.03%	0.82%	9.72%	3.13%	0.23%	38.22%

Notes: This table reports the ratio of service exports from a given province to each of the other provinces and to the rest of the world. All the values are calculated as the export value from province  $i$  to province  $j$  relative to region  $i$ 's total exports of services. Source: Statistics Canada.

TABLE A.2 – Domestic Exports by Industry and Region

	Fire	Wholesale	Transport	Professional	Communication	Accommodation	Entertainment	Education & Health	Others
Alberta	17%	18%	16%	24%	7%	7%	1%	1%	8%
British Columbia	13%	12%	23%	27%	7%	10%	3%	1%	4%
Manitoba	20%	19%	29%	17%	6%	5%	1%	1%	2%
New Brunswick	12%	14%	16%	38%	5%	8%	4%	1%	1%
Newfoundland	14%	9%	26%	24%	9%	11%	2%	2%	2%
Northwest Territories	8%	3%	58%	8%	9%	8%	1%	1%	4%
Nova Scotia	18%	15%	15%	21%	8%	14%	2%	5%	1%
Nunavut	11%	12%	30%	18%	19%	6%	3%	0%	1%
Ontario	31%	21%	9%	26%	8%	2%	0%	1%	1%
Prince Edward Island	13%	11%	16%	27%	4%	20%	3%	2%	3%
Quebec	21%	22%	12%	28%	10%	3%	2%	1%	2%
Saskatchewan	16%	28%	21%	15%	6%	6%	1%	2%	3%
Yukon	16%	11%	27%	8%	20%	10%	2%	2%	3%
Mean	16%	15%	23%	22%	9%	8%	2%	2%	3%
SD	6%	7%	12%	8%	5%	5%	1%	1%	2%

Notes: This table reports the ratio of domestic service exports, for nine different service subsectors, from a given province to all other provinces. All the values are calculated as the export value from province  $i$  to all Canadian provinces relative to region  $i$ 's total domestic exports of services. Source: Statistics Canada.

TABLE A.3 – International Exports by Industry and Region

	Fire	Wholesale	Transport	Professional	Communication	Accommodation	Entertainment	Education & Health	Others
Alberta	6%	21%	45%	15%	1%	8%	1%	2%	0%
British Columbia	6%	15%	29%	20%	9%	14%	3%	4%	0%
Manitoba	8%	21%	45%	14%	2%	6%	1%	3%	0%
New Brunswick	6%	18%	50%	14%	2%	8%	1%	3%	0%
Newfoundland	7%	14%	18%	14%	32%	11%	1%	2%	0%
Northwest Territories	14%	45%	9%	19%	2%	7%	3%	1%	0%
Nova Scotia	13%	18%	25%	19%	3%	14%	2%	6%	0%
Nunavut	19%	1%	11%	17%	26%	17%	8%	0%	0%
Ontario	14%	22%	14%	30%	5%	9%	2%	4%	0%
Prince Edward Island	5%	12%	59%	5%	1%	12%	2%	4%	0%
Quebec	11%	24%	22%	26%	5%	8%	2%	2%	0%
Saskatchewan	4%	41%	40%	8%	1%	3%	1%	2%	0%
Yukon	11%	3%	17%	12%	5%	46%	5%	1%	1%
Mean	10%	20%	30%	16%	7%	12%	2%	3%	0%
SD	5%	12%	16%	7%	10%	11%	2%	2%	0%

Note Notes: This table reports the ratio of international service exports, for nine different service subsectors, from a given province to the rest of the world. All the values are calculated as the export value from province  $i$  to the rest of the world relative to region  $i$ 's total international exports of services. Source: Statistics Canada.

TABLE A.4 – Production parameters

Parameter	Description	Max	Min	Mean
$\lambda_{i,k}$	Value-added share in gross output for sector $k$			
$g$ (Goods)		0.52	0.27	0.41
$ls$ (Low-trad. services)		0.77	0.65	0.74
$ms$ (Mid-trad. services)		0.72	0.64	0.69
$hs$ (High-trad. services)		0.61	0.55	0.59
$\gamma_{i,k,n}$	Share of intermediate inputs sourced from $n$ to $k$			
$g, g$	Goods to goods	0.82	0.61	0.71
$ls, g$	Goods to low-trad. services	0.00	0.00	0.00
$ms, g$	Goods to mid-trad. services	0.09	0.04	0.07
$hs, g$	Goods to high-trad. services	0.31	0.14	0.22
$g, ls$	Low-trad. services to goods	0.44	0.32	0.38
$ls, ls$	Low-trad. services to low-trad. Services	0.19	0.04	0.12
$ms, ls$	Low-trad. services to mid-trad. Services	0.15	0.08	0.11
$hs, ls$	Low-trad. services to high-trad. Services	0.48	0.33	0.38
$g, ms$	Mid-trad. services to goods	0.29	0.17	0.23
$ls, ms$	Mid-trad. services to low-trad. Services	0.01	0.00	0.01
$ms, ms$	Mid-trad. services to mid-trad. Services	0.48	0.37	0.42
$hs, ms$	Mid-trad. services to high-trad. Services	0.40	0.30	0.34
$g, hs$	High-trad. services to goods	0.38	0.25	0.29
$ls, hs$	High-trad. services to low-trad. Services	0.01	0.01	0.01
$ms, hs$	High-trad. services to mid-trad. Services	0.22	0.15	0.20
$hs, hs$	High-trad. services to high-trad. Services	0.54	0.46	0.50






FIGURE A.1 – Domestic (inter-provincial) and international service trade as a fraction of GDP, 1992–2017, Canada



(A) Consumption expenditure share



(B) Net export to GDP ratio

FIGURE A.2 – Value-added versus consumption expenditure share of high-tradable services, or net export to GDP ratio of high-tradable services




FIGURE A.3 – Income and price effect on sectoral VA share with absent domestic service trade

Notes: To analyze the price effect, we keep the real income ( $C_i$ ) unchanged from the baseline model and only adjust the sectoral prices to the counterfactual case without domestic service trade (Baseline with CF. P). Conversely, to examine the income effect, we maintain the sectoral prices ( $P_i^k$ ) at the baseline model level and alter the real income values to the case without domestic service trade (Baseline with CF. C).




FIGURE A.4 – Consumption and net export channel on sectoral VA share with absent international service trade

Notes: To assess the impact of consumption expenditure in shaping structural transformation, we maintain the net exports at the same level as the baseline model and only adjust the consumption expenditure to the case with the absence of international service trade. On the other hand, we measure net export contribution by setting the consumption expenditure unchanged at the baseline level and changing the net exports to the case with the absence of international service trade.

## B Robustness

### B.1 Constant production parameters

This exercise compares the welfare gains from trade presented in the main results, using constant average production parameter values across all years. The results in Table B.5 are very similar to those in our benchmark calibration.

TABLE B.5 – Welfare gains with constant production parameters

Provinces	Domestic Trade		International Trade	
	Goods	Services	Goods	Services
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Alberta	0.05 (0.05)	0.07 (0.07)	0.08 (0.08)	0.02 (0.02)
British Columbia	0.05 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	0.10 (0.10)	0.04 (0.04)
Northwest Territories including Nunavut	0.09 (0.09)	0.27 (0.27)	0.11 (0.11)	0.04 (0.04)
Manitoba	0.10 (0.10)	0.10 (0.10)	0.11 (0.11)	0.03 (0.03)
New Brunswick	0.11 (0.11)	0.09 (0.09)	0.19 (0.19)	0.04 (0.04)
Newfoundland and Labrador	0.06 (0.06)	0.10 (0.10)	0.08 (0.08)	0.02 (0.02)
Nova Scotia	0.08 (0.08)	0.07 (0.07)	0.11 (0.11)	0.03 (0.03)
Ontario	0.05 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	0.21 (0.21)	0.04 (0.04)
Prince Edward Island	0.10 (0.10)	0.10 (0.10)	0.07 (0.07)	0.02 (0.02)
Quebec	0.06 (0.06)	0.05 (0.05)	0.15 (0.15)	0.03 (0.03)
Saskatchewan	0.08 (0.08)	0.11 (0.11)	0.10 (0.10)	0.03 (0.03)

Note: The value outside the parentheses represents baseline welfare with production parameters varying from 2009 to 2017 (excluding 2012 and 2013). The value inside the parentheses shows welfare with constant production parameters from 1992 to 2017.

### B.2 The role of transportation and warehouse

To evaluate the role of indirect trade on the results, we recalculate our results, allowing trade in transportation and warehousing services when other service trades are absent. By doing so, we essentially take transportation and warehousing as a "goods" sector.

The results of this exercise are presented in Table B.6. Given that transportation is a crucial sector (the largest trade to GDP ratio in Table 2), the quantitative significance of high-tradable services trade decreases by 1 percentage point for both domestic and international trade. Nevertheless, regional disparities and time trends persist. Provinces with

a comparative disadvantage in service production, such as the Northwest Territories and Nunavut, continue to experience the highest welfare gains from service trade.

TABLE B.6 – Role of transportation on welfare gains

Provinces	Domestic Trade		International Trade	
	Goods	Services	Goods	Services
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Alberta	0.05 (0.06)	0.07 (0.05)	0.08 (0.09)	0.02 (0.02)
British Columbia	0.05 (0.05)	0.05 (0.04)	0.10 (0.11)	0.04 (0.02)
Northwest Territories including Nunavut	0.09 (0.14)	0.27 (0.18)	0.11 (0.11)	0.04 (0.04)
Manitoba	0.10 (0.12)	0.10 (0.07)	0.11 (0.11)	0.03 (0.02)
New Brunswick	0.11 (0.13)	0.09 (0.07)	0.19 (0.19)	0.04 (0.02)
Newfoundland and Labrador	0.06 (0.07)	0.10 (0.08)	0.08 (0.09)	0.02 (0.02)
Nova Scotia	0.08 (0.10)	0.07 (0.05)	0.11 (0.11)	0.03 (0.02)
Ontario	0.05 (0.06)	0.05 (0.04)	0.21 (0.22)	0.04 (0.04)
Prince Edward Island	0.10 (0.13)	0.10 (0.07)	0.07 (0.07)	0.02 (0.02)
Quebec	0.06 (0.07)	0.05 (0.04)	0.15 (0.15)	0.03 (0.03)
Saskatchewan	0.08 (0.10)	0.11 (0.08)	0.10 (0.11)	0.03 (0.02)

Note: The value outside the parentheses represents baseline welfare where transportation and warehouse services are high-tradable. The value inside the parentheses shows welfare with transportation and warehouse services treated as goods.

### B.3 The role of comparative advantages

This exercise explores the role of comparative advantages by assuming that the fundamental TFP ratio of all sub-service sectors to goods is uniform across provinces and equal to the national average TFP ratio for each sector annually. As shown in Figure B.5, the elimination of comparative advantage has sizable effects on the value added share of services as similar to the increase in trade barriers in the main counterfactual exercises.

The left panel of Figure B.6 illustrates the relationship between the TFP ratio of high-tradable services to goods and the change in the services value-added share. Provinces with a comparative advantage in service production see a decline in services value-added share when the comparative advantage is eliminated across provinces. Conversely, provinces with a comparative advantage in goods production experience an increase in their services value-added share due to higher productivity in service production. The right panel of Figure B.6 depicts the relationship between the TFP ratio of high-tradable services to goods and

changes in welfare. Provinces with a comparative advantage in services production incur welfare losses as a result of reduced services productivity.





FIGURE B.5 – Average percentage change (%) in value-added share of services (no comparative advantage - baseline)



(A) Comparative Advantage ( $\Delta(VA_{Services}/VA)$ )      (B) Services Comparative Advantage, Welfare

FIGURE B.6 – Role of comparative advantages on value-added share and welfare

## B.4 Changing the time period to 1997–2017

One of the concerns about the trade flow data before 1997 is that there are many missing values, and thus the possibility that the results depend on the imputed data. Therefore, for robustness, we check if our results hold for the period 1997–2017, we repeat the exercises by only considering the data from 1997 to 2017. Table B.7 and Figure B.7 show the results for the empirical analyses, and Table B.8 shows the results for the counterfactual exercises. The numbers in the tables and figure confirm that the results are unchanged even if we consider the period 1997–2017.

TABLE B.7 – Domestic and international, gross trade flows relative to GDP for goods and services, averaged over 1997–2017, Canada

Provinces	Goods		Services	
	Domestic	International	Domestic	International
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Canada	0.23	0.60	0.22	0.14
Alberta	0.26	0.53	0.21	0.10
British Columbia	0.18	0.42	0.23	0.15
Manitoba	0.39	0.50	0.36	0.12
New Brunswick	0.49	0.92	0.39	0.14
Newfoundland and Labrador	0.33	0.67	0.26	0.08
Northwest Territories including Nunavut	0.41	0.54	0.47	0.07
Nova Scotia	0.34	0.50	0.34	0.12
Ontario	0.17	0.70	0.19	0.17
Prince Edward Island	0.48	0.42	0.47	0.12
Quebec	0.24	0.58	0.20	0.13
Saskatchewan	0.39	0.59	0.29	0.12
Yukon	0.32	0.30	0.48	0.13

Notes: The numbers are for gross trade flows (exports plus imports). All the values are calculated as the trade flow value in a region relative to the region's GDP. Source: Statistics Canada.




FIGURE B.7 – Domestic and international net exports of services to GDP ratios, averaged over 1997–2017

TABLE B.8 – Welfare gains using the 1997–2017 data

Provinces	Domestic Trade		International Trade	
	Goods	Services	Goods	Services
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Alberta	0.05 (0.05)	0.07 (0.06)	0.08 (0.08)	0.02 (0.02)
British Columbia	0.05 (0.04)	0.05 (0.05)	0.10 (0.10)	0.04 (0.04)
Northwest Territories including Nunavut	0.09 (0.09)	0.27 (0.27)	0.11 (0.12)	0.04 (0.03)
Manitoba	0.10 (0.10)	0.10 (0.10)	0.11 (0.11)	0.03 (0.03)
New Brunswick	0.11 (0.10)	0.09 (0.10)	0.19 (0.20)	0.04 (0.04)
Newfoundland and Labrador	0.06 (0.06)	0.10 (0.10)	0.08 (0.08)	0.02 (0.02)
Nova Scotia	0.08 (0.08)	0.07 (0.08)	0.11 (0.10)	0.03 (0.03)
Ontario	0.05 (0.04)	0.05 (0.05)	0.21 (0.20)	0.04 (0.04)
Prince Edward Island	0.10 (0.10)	0.10 (0.11)	0.07 (0.07)	0.02 (0.03)
Quebec	0.06 (0.06)	0.05 (0.05)	0.15 (0.14)	0.03 (0.03)
Saskatchewan	0.08 (0.08)	0.11 (0.10)	0.10 (0.10)	0.03 (0.03)

Notes: The numbers outside brackets are for welfare gains using trade flows from 1992 to 2017 (baseline), and the numbers inside brackets are for welfare gains using trade flows from 1997 to 2017.

## C Counterfactual experiments for sub-services sector

In this section, we run the counterfactual exercises for each of high-tradable, mid-tradable, and low-tradable service sectors. As in the main analysis, we run the exercises assuming the absence of domestic and international trade. The results for the value-added shares and welfare gains are shown in the tables below.

### C.1 Sub-service trade and regional Specialization

TABLE C.9 – Percent change (%) on different channels with the absence of domestic high-tradable service trade

Average change (%) over 1992-2017	No Domestic High-Tradable Trade						
	$C$ (1)	$P_{hs}/P_{ms}$ (2)	$P_{hs}/P_{ls}$ (3)	$P_{hs}/P_g$ (4)	$PC_{hs}/PC$ (5)	$NX_{hs}/VA$ (6)	$VA_{hs}/VA$ (7)
<b>Canadian Provinces</b>							
Alberta	-4.6	6.0	5.9	5.5	0.3	0.7	1.8
British Columbia	-4.2	5.0	5.1	4.3	0.2	-0.4	-0.7
Northwest Territories & Nunavut	-23.4	34.0	31.5	32.6	-0.5	9.6	27.1
Manitoba	-7.6	9.0	9.2	7.6	0.1	-1.8	-3.3
New Brunswick	-7.5	11.9	11.7	11.6	0.6	3.8	7.2
Newfoundland and Labrador	-7.2	14.8	13.8	15.4	1.2	8.5	27.3
Nova Scotia	-6.2	10.5	10.3	10.6	0.8	4.5	9.4
Ontario	-3.6	2.9	3.1	1.8	-0.2	-2.7	-4.8
Prince Edward Island	-8.9	16.2	15.7	16.4	1.2	7.0	15.4
Quebec	-4.0	4.6	4.8	4.2	0.0	-0.1	-0.0
Saskatchewan	-7.9	12.8	12.5	12.9	0.9	5.2	14.2

Notes: Each column reports the average percent deviation, for the period 1992–2017, in the no domestic service trade economy, compared to the benchmark economy.

TABLE C.10 – Percent change (%) on different channels with the absence of domestic mid-tradable service trade

Average change (%) over 1992-2017	No Domestic Mid-Tradable Trade						
	$C$ (1)	$P_{ms}/P_{ts}$ (2)	$P_{ms}/P_{hs}$ (3)	$P_{ms}/P_g$ (4)	$PC_{ms}/PC$ (5)	$NX_{ms}/VA$ (6)	$VA_{ms}/VA$ (7)
<b>Canadian Provinces</b>							
Alberta	-2.0	3.7	3.6	3.7	0.6	1.6	6.7
British Columbia	-1.3	2.4	2.4	2.6	0.4	1.4	4.1
Northwest Territories & Nunavut	-4.2	9.5	10.1	10.0	1.6	5.5	26.4
Manitoba	-2.3	4.4	4.4	4.7	0.7	1.7	6.3
New Brunswick	-2.0	5.3	5.6	6.2	1.0	4.1	14.2
Newfoundland and Labrador	-2.3	5.8	6.0	6.3	1.1	3.5	18.4
Nova Scotia	-1.5	3.5	3.6	3.8	0.6	2.4	6.9
Ontario	-1.6	1.1	0.7	0.3	-0.0	-2.7	-7.7
Prince Edward Island	-1.8	5.1	5.5	5.8	1.0	3.7	12.8
Quebec	-1.5	2.5	2.5	2.6	0.4	0.8	3.0
Saskatchewan	-2.5	5.9	6.2	6.5	1.1	3.8	18.2

Notes: Each column reports the average percent deviation, for the period 1992–2017, in the no domestic service trade economy, compared to the benchmark economy.

TABLE C.11 – Percent change (%) on different channels with the absence of domestic low-tradable service trade

Average change (%) over 1992-2017	No Domestic Low-Tradable Trade						
	$C$ (1)	$P_{ls}/P_{ms}$ (2)	$P_{ls}/P_{hs}$ (3)	$P_{ls}/P_g$ (4)	$PC_{ls}/PC$ (5)	$NX_{ls}/VA$ (6)	$VA_{ls}/VA$ (7)
<b>Canadian Provinces</b>							
Alberta	-0.0	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.1
British Columbia	-0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
Northwest Territories & Nunavut	-0.1	1.5	1.5	1.5	0.4	1.1	4.5
Manitoba	0.0	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.1	0.2	0.9
New Brunswick	-0.1	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.1	0.3	1.2
Newfoundland and Labrador	-0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.1
Nova Scotia	-0.2	0.3	0.3	0.2	-0.1	-0.1	-0.9
Ontario	-0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	-0.0	-0.1	-0.6
Prince Edward Island	0.1	1.0	1.1	1.1	0.4	0.6	2.8
Quebec	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.4
Saskatchewan	0.1	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.9

Notes: Each column reports the average percent deviation, for the period 1992–2017, in the no domestic service trade economy, compared to the benchmark economy.

TABLE C.12 – Percent change (%) on different channels with the absence of international high-tradable service trade

Average change (%) over 1992-2017	No International High-Tradable Trade						
	$C$ (1)	$P_{hs}/P_{ms}$ (2)	$P_{hs}/P_{ls}$ (3)	$P_{hs}/P_g$ (4)	$PC_{hs}/PC$ (5)	$NX_{hs}/VA$ (6)	$VA_{hs}/VA$ (7)
<b>Canadian Provinces</b>							
Alberta	-1.9	1.8	1.9	1.2	-0.0	-3.2	-6.7
British Columbia	-3.0	2.3	2.5	0.9	-0.2	-4.0	-7.3
Northwest Territories & Nunavut	-3.1	2.6	2.5	1.8	-0.3	-3.5	-10.5
Manitoba	-2.4	2.3	2.4	1.5	-0.1	-2.5	-4.8
New Brunswick	-3.1	1.9	2.2	0.1	-0.5	-4.5	-8.3
Newfoundland and Labrador	-1.5	1.5	1.5	0.7	-0.1	-3.3	-10.2
Nova Scotia	-2.3	1.9	2.0	0.6	-0.2	-2.5	-5.2
Ontario	-3.4	3.0	3.2	2.0	-0.1	-2.4	-4.1
Prince Edward Island	-2.0	1.4	1.6	0.3	-0.2	-3.9	-8.0
Quebec	-2.5	2.0	2.2	1.1	-0.2	-2.8	-5.2
Saskatchewan	-2.3	1.9	2.0	1.0	-0.1	-5.1	-13.2

Notes: Each column reports the average percent deviation, for the period 1992–2017, in the no domestic service trade economy, compared to the benchmark economy.

TABLE C.13 – Percent change (%) on different channels with the absence of international mid-tradable service trade

Average change (%) over 1992-2017	No International Mid-Tradable Trade						
	$C$ (1)	$P_{ms}/P_{ts}$ (2)	$P_{ms}/P_{hs}$ (3)	$P_{ms}/P_g$ (4)	$PC_{ms}/PC$ (5)	$NX_{ms}/VA$ (6)	$VA_{ms}/VA$ (7)
<b>Canadian Provinces</b>							
Alberta	-0.5	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.1	0.5	2.0
British Columbia	-0.5	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.1	0.3	0.8
Northwest Territories & Nunavut	-0.9	0.8	0.6	0.7	0.0	0.4	1.0
Manitoba	-0.5	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.1	0.3	1.2
New Brunswick	-0.6	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.1	0.3	0.9
Newfoundland and Labrador	-0.5	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.1	0.3	1.7
Nova Scotia	-0.5	0.8	0.6	0.7	0.1	0.3	0.7
Ontario	-0.9	1.7	1.6	1.8	0.3	0.8	2.3
Prince Edward Island	-0.3	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.1	0.3	1.2
Quebec	-0.7	1.4	1.3	1.5	0.2	0.5	2.0
Saskatchewan	-0.4	0.9	0.9	1.0	0.2	0.5	2.7

Notes: Each column reports the average percent deviation, for the period 1992–2017, in the no domestic service trade economy, compared to the benchmark economy.

TABLE C.14 – Percent change (%) on different channels with the absence of international low-tradable service trade

Average change (%) over 1992-2017	No International Low-Tradable Trade						
	$C$ (1)	$P_{ls}/P_{ms}$ (2)	$P_{ls}/P_{hs}$ (3)	$P_{ls}/P_g$ (4)	$PC_{ls}/PC$ (5)	$NX_{ls}/VA$ (6)	$VA_{ls}/VA$ (7)
<b>Canadian Provinces</b>							
Alberta	-0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1
British Columbia	-0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	-0.0	-0.1	-0.7
Northwest Territories & Nunavut	-0.3	0.2	0.1	0.1	-0.1	0.2	0.1
Manitoba	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.2
New Brunswick	-0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	-0.0	0.0	-0.2
Newfoundland and Labrador	-0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	-0.0	0.0	-0.1
Nova Scotia	-0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	-0.1	-0.0	-0.4
Ontario	-0.0	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.2
Prince Edward Island	-0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	-0.1	-0.4
Quebec	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.2
Saskatchewan	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.6

Notes: Each column reports the average percent deviation, for the period 1992–2017, in the no domestic service trade economy, compared to the benchmark economy.

## C.2 Sub-service trade and welfare

TABLE C.15 – Welfare gains from domestic and international trade (Goods and high-tradable services)

Provinces	Domestic Trade		International Trade	
	Goods	High-Tradable	Goods	High-Tradable
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Alberta	0.05	0.05	0.08	0.02
British Columbia	0.05	0.04	0.10	0.03
Northwest Territories including Nunavut	0.09	0.23	0.11	0.03
Manitoba	0.10	0.08	0.11	0.02
New Brunswick	0.11	0.07	0.19	0.03
Newfoundland and Labrador	0.06	0.07	0.08	0.02
Nova Scotia	0.08	0.06	0.11	0.02
Ontario	0.05	0.04	0.21	0.03
Prince Edward Island	0.10	0.09	0.07	0.02
Quebec	0.06	0.04	0.15	0.03
Saskatchewan	0.08	0.08	0.10	0.02

TABLE C.16 – Welfare gains from domestic and international trade (Mid-tradable and low-tradable services)

Provinces	Domestic Trade		International Trade	
	Mid-Tradable	Nontrad	Mid-Tradable	Nontrad
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Alberta	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00
British Columbia	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00
Northwest Territories including Nunavut	0.04	0.00	0.01	0.00
Manitoba	0.02	-0.00	0.00	-0.00
New Brunswick	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.00
Newfoundland and Labrador	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00
Nova Scotia	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00
Ontario	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.00
Prince Edward Island	0.02	-0.00	0.00	0.00
Quebec	0.01	-0.00	0.01	-0.00
Saskatchewan	0.02	-0.00	0.00	-0.00

## D Welfare calculations using the equivalent variation method

In this section, we will check the welfare changes from trade liberalization using equivalent variation. Comin (2021) demonstrates that the real consumption index,  $C_{it}$ , is subject to a vector of weights assigned to different sectors. The construction of non-homotheticity implies a special case in which full weight is allocated to the base sector while other sectors receive zero weight. Consequently, there would be a set of real consumption indexes, along with corresponding parameters, that reflect the same non-homothetic CES preferences. Hence, under a non-homothetic preferences structure,  $C_{it}$  does not serve as an appropriate measure of welfare. As an alternative, our paper performs welfare analysis utilizing the Equivalent Variation (EV) method.

The EV approach quantifies variations in consumption expenditure due to changes in utility, with prices held constant at baseline levels. From (4.5), the consumption expenditure per capita can be written as

$$e(\{P_{it}^k\}_k, C_{it}) = \left( \sum_{k \in \{g, hs, ms, ls\}} \omega_k \left( \frac{C_{it}}{L_{it}} \right)^{\epsilon_k - \sigma} (P_{it}^k)^{1 - \sigma} \right)^{\frac{1}{1 - \sigma}} \quad (\text{D.1})$$

Then the welfare changes from trade can be defined as  $1 - \frac{e(\{P_{it}^k\}_k, C_{it})}{e(\{P_{it}^k\}_k, C'_{it})}$ , where  $C'_{it}$  denotes the aggregate utility level by shutting down trade flows.

We then reproduce the welfare analysis from Section 5.3 using the EV method. As reported in Table D.17, even though the average welfare improvements are quantitatively smaller for all trade flow types, the relative magnitude and disparity pattern remain consistent. The positive correlation relationship between welfare gains and the extent of regional specialization is also indicated in Figure D.8 and Figure D.9.

TABLE D.17 – Welfare gains from domestic and international trade

Provinces	Domestic Trade		International Trade	
	Goods	Services	Goods	Services
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Alberta	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.01
British Columbia	0.03	0.03	0.07	0.02
Northwest Territories including Nunavut	0.05	0.14	0.06	0.02
Manitoba	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.02
New Brunswick	0.07	0.06	0.12	0.02
Newfoundland and Labrador	0.04	0.07	0.06	0.01
Nova Scotia	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.02
Ontario	0.03	0.03	0.12	0.02
Prince Edward Island	0.07	0.07	0.04	0.02
Quebec	0.04	0.03	0.08	0.02
Saskatchewan	0.05	0.07	0.06	0.02
Average welfare gain	0.03	0.04	0.09	0.02
S.D. of welfare gain	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.00
Change in S.D. of log real wage	-0.19	-0.07	-0.02	-0.13

Notes: The results in each column are obtained by comparing the benchmark and the counterfactual where domestic or international trade in services or goods is absent. Different from Table 7, we are using EV as a welfare measure.






FIGURE D.8 – Scatter plot of average welfare gains from domestic service trade against import (IM) or export (EX) shares



(A) Import share



(B) Export share

FIGURE D.9 – Scatter plot of average welfare gains from international service trade against import (IM) or export (EX) shares

## E Data

This section describes the details of the data and the strategies for data cleaning. Broadly speaking, we need (a) Canadian bilateral trade flows at inter-provincial and international levels; (b) value-added data in current and constant prices for Canadian provinces and the rest of world; (c) consumption expenditure data in current and constant prices for Canadian provinces; (d) sectoral labor endowment by province in Canada and by country in the rest of world; (e) coefficients from the provincial input-output matrix; (f) provincial investment and government expenditure data. Web links to data sources are documented in the footnotes.

### E.1 Canadian trade flow data

Derivation on Canadian trade flows since the late nineties was described in detail in [Généreux and Langen \(2002\)](#). In general, Canadian trade flow measures are constructed in two steps. First, raw inter-provincial and international trade flows are collected from various administrative statistics. The measures of inter-provincial trade are obtained from Commodity Surveys for the origin and destination of sales. The international data are primarily sourced from Canadian International Merchandise Trade and Canadian Balance of International Payments. However, such trade patterns may not be consistent with the concept required by the inter-provincial and international trade flows. Hence, in the second step, these trade patterns are adjusted to reconcile with provincial supply and demand from the input-output tables. Finally, trade flows, both inter-provincially and internationally, are adjusted to be entirely in accord with the Canadian national account data.

#### Interprovincial trade flow data

Interprovincial trade flows for services are broadly categorized into 1) transportation, 2) communications, 3) business services, 4) financial services, 5) wholesale and retail trade, and 6) recreational services, while 7) goods trade includes flows of agricultural and manufacturing goods, as well as utilities.

1. The trade flows for transportation services are obtained from origin/destination data provided by carriers, which is supplied by the Transportation Division. Specifically, air transportation flows are determined based on passenger traffic volumes, while trade flows for railway, truck, and water transportation are derived from goods transportation surveys conducted by carriers.

2. Trade patterns for communications have limited data sources, leading to imputed trade flows that depend heavily on proxies and assumptions. It is assumed that there are no trade flows for revenue from local radio and television. The trade volume for advertising sales and telephone communications is estimated using provincial sectoral demand as a weighting factor.
3. Trade patterns for business and computer services are constructed using the destination of sales from the Statistics Canada Annual Surveys of Services Industries.
4. Origin/destination information is not available for financial services. Interprovincial trade flows for financial services were imputed based on a number of perceived economic situations and relationships within the Canadian economy.
5. Trade patterns for wholesale and retail trade are based on the question about the destination of sales from annual surveys of various services industries. Specifically, interprovincial trade data for wholesale margins is obtained from the Wholesale Trade Commodity Survey by Origin and Destination.
6. Trade patterns for recreation services are based on the question about the destination of sales from annual surveys of various services industries. Specifically, interprovincial trade patterns are developed using the Canadian Travel Survey, which provides information on the province of origin of travelers and their travel expenditures on accommodations, and restaurant establishments.
7. Interprovincial trade patterns in the goods sector are well documented through annual surveys conducted by various industrial divisions of Statistics Canada. Interprovincial trade flows for agriculture, manufacturing, and utilities are derived from surveys by the Agriculture Division, the Annual Survey of Manufacturers (ASM), and disposition tables provided by the Energy Section of Statistics Canada.

### **International trade flow data**

International trade information is collected from two administrative statistics: 1) Canadian Balance of International Payments for services and 2) Canadian International Merchandise Trade for goods.

1. International trade flows in services are derived from the Canadian Balance of International Payments (BOP) program. A variety of data sources are used as weighting indicators to allocate international services imports and exports across provinces. For

example, provincial wages are used to distribute commercial services, the number of international students helps apportion education exports, and the cargo tonnage of foreign carriers is used to allocate air flight payments. In general, these proxy methods are similar to those employed for the imputation of interprovincial trade flows.

2. Information on international trade in the goods sector is gathered from administrative statistics provided by the Canadian International Merchandise Trade. The provincial estimates primarily serve as the key sources for international trade flows of the goods industry by province. The Canadian International Merchandise Trade program defines the origin as the province of the final point of shipment, which differs from the trade flows program, where origin is identified as the province of production. To address the data limitations of provincial estimates, some data adjustments are made using the Wholesale Trade Commodity Surveys by Origin and Destination.

### **Constructing the province-year panel data of trade flows**

We take trade data from the following three sources:

- (a) International & inter-provincial trade flows from 1992–1996,<sup>32</sup>
- (b) International & inter-provincial trade flows from 1997–2006,<sup>33</sup>
- (c) International & Inter-provincial trade flows from 2007–2017.<sup>34</sup>

For each province in Canada, we collect trade data on international exports, international imports and inter-provincial exports. We compute inter-provincial imports by assuming the amount that Province 1 exports to Province 2 is equivalent to the amount that Province 2 imports from Province 1. We obtain trade flows for goods and services by aggregating trade values across various sub-sectors over the period 2007–2017. For years prior to 2007, we measure trade values for services as those for total services. This strategy is feasible as we assume zero trade flows in non-tradable services. We take trade flows from 1997–2017 as baseline data, since trade flows from 1997 onwards rely on more comprehensive and robust surveys. We then connect data from the source (a) to obtain trade flows over the period 1992–2017. Specifically, for the years from 1992–1996, we first calculate the annual growth rate of trade flows of each province. We then impute the trade flows prior to 1997 backward using the annual growth rate and the trade value in 1997.

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<sup>32</sup><https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/cv.action?pid=1210008501>

<sup>33</sup><https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/cv.action?pid=1210008601>

<sup>34</sup><https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/cv.action?pid=1210008801>

Note that missing values exist in trade flows from source (a). For example, international exports at the sectoral level are missing in Quebec for the period 1992–1996. To deal with this issue, we compute the international good and services export ratio in Quebec in 1997. We then multiply the ratio by total international exports and fill in missing values for goods and services prior to 1997. A shortcoming of this strategy is that we assume the constant good-to-service trade ratio over this period. If the trade value is missing in the year 1997 of source (a), we will impute the value using the 1996–1997 growth rate from the Statcan Inter-provincial and International Trade 1992–1998 handbook.<sup>35</sup>

## E.2 Other data for Canada

**Nominal value-added** We obtain nominal value-added data in Canada from three sources:

- (a) Value-added at current prices from 1992–1996,<sup>36</sup>
- (b) Value-add at current price from 1997–2017,<sup>37</sup>
- (c) National nominal GDP index from 1992–2017,<sup>38</sup>

To begin with, we collect provincial nominal value-added data for 19 sub-sectors over the period 1997–2017 from source (b) and use it as baseline data. This comprehensive dataset enables us to keep track of value-added shares on a provincial level. For years prior to 1997, we rely on source (a) and compute annual nominal value-added growth rates for each province and each sector. We use growth rates here to avoid discontinuity caused by different measurement methods between source (a) and (b). By applying growth rates to baseline data, we can impute the nominal value-added data backward for the period of 1992–1996.

There are missing values in source (a), for which we’ve employed specific strategies: We first address these gaps through linear interpolation between the years for which data is available. The interpolation strategy is applied to the missing values in sectors 54 and 71, as detailed in Table E.18. In instances where linear interpolation is not feasible, we extrapolate the sectoral value-added data for years preceding 1997 by using the growth rate of the national GDP index across various sectors. We resort to this method with caution,

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<sup>35</sup>Check pdf version of the handbook for more details: <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/pub/15-546-x/15-546-x1998001-eng.pdf?st=XnNBEgzL>

<sup>36</sup><https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/cv.action?pid=3610039601>

<sup>37</sup><https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/cv.action?pid=3610040201>

<sup>38</sup><https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/cv.action?pid=3610020801>

as it might not capture the provincial heterogeneity in the value-added growth rate. This extrapolation strategy is utilized for sectors 21, 48-49, and 53, as seen in Table E.18.

**Real value-added** We take real value-added data from two sources:

- (a) Value-added at constant price at provincial level from 1997–2017,<sup>39</sup>
- (b) National real GDP index from 1992–2017.<sup>40</sup>

To construct Canadian real value-added data, we rely on source (a) and obtain the industry-province-specific real value-added for 1997–2017. Given that provincial real value-added data only starts from 1997, we apply the national real value-added index for the period 1992–1996. The national real value-added index is a chained Fisher quantity index (QI) of GDP with the base year of 2012.<sup>41</sup> We iterate forward and backward to solve for the annual series of real value-added in 2012 U.S. dollars, applying the implied growth rate from QI across sub-sectors. In particular, by setting  $VA_{2012}^{Real} = VA_{2012}^{Nominal}$ , we have

$$\frac{VA_t^{Real}}{VA_{2012}^{Real}} = \frac{VA_t^{Real}}{VA_{2012}^{Nominal}} = \frac{QI_t}{QI_{2012}}.$$

The next step is to generate an annual series of sub-sector price indexes by taking the division of national nominal and real value-added. By assuming a homogeneous price index across provinces, we impute the provincial real value-added growth rate for 1992–1996 using provincial nominal value-added and national price indexes. The growth rate enables us to extrapolate the sub-sector real value-added data prior to 1997 using the baseline data from source (a). Finally, we aggregate the sub-sectors up to three sectors (goods and high-, mid- and low-tradable services), using the computation process as follows:

$$VA_{k,t}^{Nominal} = VA_{k,t}^{Nominal} \quad \text{if } t = 2012;$$

$$\Delta \log VA_{k,t}^{Real} = \sum_b \frac{1}{2}(w_{b,t} + w_{b,t-1}) \Delta \log VA_{b,t}^{Real} \quad \text{if } t \text{ in other years,}$$

where  $VA_{b,t}^{Real}$  is the value-added at constant price in year  $t$  in sub-sector  $b$  and  $w_{b,t}$  is the nominal value-added weight of sub-sector  $b$  in sector  $k$ .

<sup>39</sup><https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/cv.action?pid=3610040201>

<sup>40</sup><https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/cv.action?pid=3610021701>

<sup>41</sup>As the QI for 1992–1996 is missing in the education services sector, we impute backward using the 1997–1998 growth rate of QI.

**Consumption expenditure** Consumption expenditure data come from the following sources:

- (a) Provincial detailed household final consumption expenditure 1992–2017,<sup>42</sup>
- (b) Inter-city indexes of price differentials of consumer products,<sup>43</sup>
- (c) GGDC productivity level database.<sup>44</sup>

We collect annual household final consumption expenditure from source (a), in both current and constant 2012 prices. The data sums all sales at the product level that firms have made to households on the capital account, or in export markets. We aggregate both current and constant 2012 price expenditure into goods and high-, mid-, and low-tradable based on the IOCC product classification system. The construction of real sectoral consumption follows the same strategy as that of real value-added. To be consistent with the value-added database, public administration is not taken into account.

For the sectoral consumption price, we take the ratio between nominal consumption and real consumption so as to obtain the sectoral consumption price index for each province each year. We then rely on sources (b) and (c) to make prices comparable across Canadian provinces and sectors. Specifically, we first use the inter-city price index in source (b) to adjust the aggregate price differentials across Canadian provinces. The city-index data provides the price index across all provincial capitals at the aggregate-items level. We then make provincial prices comparable across sectors via source (c). The GGDC Productivity Level Database provides data on relative prices and labor productivity across countries up to 35 industries in 2005. We select the data for Canada and aggregate the industrial-level price into the sectoral level using the nominal value-added weight. Finally, we apply these sectoral differentials to the consumption price index, which makes it comparable both provincially and sectorally.

**Employment and wage** Employment data is collected from the following sources:

- (a) Canadian employment data across industries from 1992–2017.<sup>45</sup>

We rely on employment data in the Statcan Labour Force Characteristics Table as our measure of labor endowment. The data provides the number of workers engaged in labor

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<sup>42</sup><https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3610022501>

<sup>43</sup><https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1810000301>

<sup>44</sup><https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pld/?lang=en>

<sup>45</sup><https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/cv.action?pid=1410002301>

market activities across different sectors over the period of 1992–2017. NAICS classification system makes it consistent with the sectors in nominal value-added data. Thus, we can simply compute a sectoral wage as the ratio of nominal value-added to labor endowment.

**Input-output matrix** The input-output table comes from:

- (a) Provincial input-output tables in Canada 2004–2017.<sup>46</sup>

We rely on Canadian input-output tables to compute both input-output coefficients and value-added to gross output ratios at the provincial level. Each table documents inter-industry transactions and purchases by final demand annually. Parameter values are very different across provinces, whereas the time-series variation for each province is negligible. Therefore, we compute those provincial production parameters annually and take an average over the whole period. The parameter  $\lambda_{i,k}$  denotes the ratio of nominal value-added to gross output.  $\gamma_{i,k,n}$  measures the share of sector  $n$  goods on intermediates spendings for the production in sector  $k$ . Therefore, for each province  $i$ , we can construct a  $3 \times 1$  vector for  $\lambda_{i,k}$  and  $3 \times 3$  matrix for  $\gamma_{i,k,n}$  through a straightforward calculation from input-output data.

**Investment and government expenditures** We gather provincial investment and government expenditures for each year from the following sources:

- (a) Provincial gross domestic product, expenditure-based,<sup>47</sup>
- (b) Provincial input-output tables in Canada.<sup>48</sup>

We utilize the provincial GDP by expenditure accounts to further decompose final domestic demand into household, investment, and government sectors. By aggregating the expenditure-based GDP across final users, we are able to impute the sectoral value-added for each province using Equation (4.10). It is important to note that the expenditure GDP data is measured on the aggregate level, without breaking down into sectors. Hence, we rely on the symmetric final demand sections in provincial input-output tables for investment and government expenditures at the sectoral level. We calculate the proportion of demand stemming from all industries. This encompasses household expenditures, inventory withdrawals, and government institutions' expenditures. Hence, this final demand share enables us to impute the provincial government and investment expenditures across sectors.

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<sup>46</sup><https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/catalogue/15-211-X>

<sup>47</sup><https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3610022201>

<sup>48</sup><https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/catalogue/15-211-X>

### E.3 Other data for the rest of the world

**Countries** These Rest of the World data cover 1992–2017 for 22 countries/ regions: Argentina, Australia, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Peru, Poland, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.

**Value-added** We use the following data sources to construct nominal and real value-added for the rest of the world:

- (a) UN value-added by industries at current prices (ISIC Rev. 3),<sup>49</sup>
- (b) UN value-added by industries at constant prices (ISIC Rev. 3),<sup>50</sup>
- (c) UN value-added by industries at current prices (ISIC Rev. 4),<sup>51</sup>
- (d) UN value-added by industries at constant prices (ISIC Rev. 4),<sup>52</sup>
- (e) IMF based exchange rate.<sup>53</sup>

For nominal value-added construction, source (a) from the UN statistics division serves as the baseline data. The data provide a detailed breakdown at the sub-sector level for most countries available from the 1970s to the 2010s while missing data records for most countries after then. We use source (c) to impute missing sub-sectoral nominal value-added in the rest of the years. To handle the measurement discrepancy between ISIC Rev.3 and ISIC Rev.4, for each country-sector in source (c), we compute the annual growth rate over the missing period. Using nominal value-added data in source (a) as a baseline, these growth rates enable us to complete the nominal value-added for 22 countries over 1992–2017 through backward iteration.<sup>54</sup> Within each source, national account statistics were compiled following different time-series versions. We treat the 1993 SNA national accounts methodology as the baseline and connect with the growth rate of sub-sectoral value-added under the 1968 SNA and 2008

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<sup>49</sup>[https://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=value+added&d=SNA&f=group\\_code%3a201](https://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=value+added&d=SNA&f=group_code%3a201)

<sup>50</sup>[https://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=value+added&d=SNA&f=group\\_code%3a202](https://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=value+added&d=SNA&f=group_code%3a202)

<sup>51</sup>[https://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=value+added&d=SNA&f=group\\_code%3a204](https://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=value+added&d=SNA&f=group_code%3a204)

<sup>52</sup>[https://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=value+added&d=SNA&f=group\\_code%3a204](https://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=value+added&d=SNA&f=group_code%3a204)

<sup>53</sup><https://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/downloads>

<sup>54</sup>Among 22 countries, China’s nominal value-added data in non-tradable services was not documented in both source (a) and (c). Therefore, we assume zero employment in China’s non-tradable service sector for consistency. Additionally, Saudi Arabia’s nominal value-added data is unavailable for 2016 and 2017. We extrapolate the missing values from UN aggregate database, with the assumption that tradable and non-tradable service grows at the same rate in Saudi Arabia.

SNA frameworks. Finally, given that data is recorded in national currency in sources (a) and (c), we convert the sectoral nominal value-added into US dollar measures using source (e).

Following the same strategy in Canadian real value-added construction, we construct the RoW real value-added using the Tornqvist index and select 2012 as the base year.

**Employment and wages** Employment data is collected from the following sources:

- (a) ILO employment data from 1992–2017.<sup>55</sup>

We collect country-sector-specific employment data from the ILO database. We aggregate up sectoral nominal value-added and sectoral employment endowment across countries. Same with Canada, the wage for workers in the RoW is the ratio of these two terms.

## E.4 Classification

Given the various data sources used in this paper, we are not able to rely on a single classification system for sector aggregation. Generally, we consolidate industries into three main sectors according to three different classification systems: (1) North American Industry Classification System (NAICS); (2) International Standard Industrial Classification System (ISIC); (3) Input-Output Commodity Classification System (IOCC).

**North American industry classification system (NAICS)** The value-added and employment endowment data in Canada are documented based on NAICS. We take goods/tradable services/non-tradable service sectors in Canada as a collective of 19 sub-sectors. Details of NAICS are listed in Table E.18.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>55</sup>[https://www.ilo.org/shinyapps/bulkexplorer16/?lang=en&segment=indicator&id=EMP\\_2EMP\\_SEX\\_ECO\\_NB\\_A](https://www.ilo.org/shinyapps/bulkexplorer16/?lang=en&segment=indicator&id=EMP_2EMP_SEX_ECO_NB_A)

<sup>56</sup>Public administration [91] is not included in sectoral classification in this paper.

TABLE E.18 – Sectors classification (NAICS)

Classification system: North American Industry Classification System (NAICS)		
Sector	NAICS No.	Subsector name
<b>Goods</b>	11	Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting
	21	Mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction
	22	Utilities
	23	Construction
	31-33	Manufacturing
<b>High and Mid Tradable Services</b>	41	Wholesale trade
	44-45	Retail trade
	48-49	Transportation and warehousing
	51	Information and cultural industries
	52	Finance and insurance
	53	Real estate and rental and leasing
	54	Professional, scientific and technical services
	55	Management of companies and enterprises
	56	Waste management and remediation services
	71	Arts, entertainment and recreation
	72	Accommodation and food services
81	Other services (except public administration)	
<b>Low-tradable Services</b>	61	Educational services
	62	Health care and social assistance

**International Standard Industrial Classification System (ISIC)** Nominal value-added and employment databases for the rest of the world are measured based on the ISIC system. We obtain data that are based on the ISIC Rev.4 system for the years 2005-2015, while data for other years contain industry information according to the ISIC Rev.3 system. ISIC Rev.4 and its predecessor, ISIC Rev.3, only differ in the code numbers of industries within each sub-sector. ISIC's structure is hierarchical, and industries are aggregated into sub-sectors at higher levels. Code numbers for sub-sectors in both Revisions are the same.<sup>57</sup> We list details of ISIC sub-sectors in Table E.19.

<sup>57</sup>UN Statistics Division provides the link between ISIC Rev.3 and ISIC Rev.4, <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/classifications/Econ/ISIC.cshtml>

TABLE E.19 – Sectors classification (ISIC)

<b>Classification system: International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC)</b>		
<b>Sector</b>	<b>ISIC No.</b>	<b>Subsector name</b>
<b>Goods</b>	A+B	Agricultural, Hunting, Forestry, Fishing
	C	Mining, quarrying, and oil
	D	Manufacturing
	E	Electricity, gas and water supply
	F	Construction
<b>High and Mid Tradable Services</b>	G	Wholesale, retail trade, repair of vehicles and personal and household goods
	H	Hotels and restaurants
	I	Transport, storage and communications
	J	Financial intermediation
	K	Real estate, renting and business activities
	O	Other services (except public administration)
<b>Low-tradable Services</b>	M	Educational services
	N	Health and social work

**Input-output commodity classification system (IOCC)** Canadian provincial trade flows from 2007 to 2017 and consumption expenditure data from 1992 to 2017 are classified according to the IOCC system.<sup>58</sup> Different from NAICS and ISIC systems, the IOCC system is a product classification rather than an industry classification. Because of the wide diversity of products, the classification structure of IOCC is built at a more detailed level. We provide the IOCC’s sectoral details in Table E.20.

<sup>58</sup>Due to data limitations, we do not make sectoral disaggregation for years prior to 2007. See section E.1 for more details.

TABLE E.20 – Sectors Classification (IOCC)

<b>Classification system: North American Industry Classification System (IOCC)</b>		
<b>Sector</b>	<b>IOCC No.</b>	<b>Subsector name</b>
<b>Goods</b>	M11_	Agricultural and farm products
	M21_	Mineral,oil and gas products
	M22_	Utilities
	M23_	Construction
	M31_	Processed food and beverages
	M32_	Chemical, plastic and wood products
	M33_	Industrial machinery, electronic products and Transportation equipment
<b>High and Mid Tradable Services</b>	M41_	Wholesale margins and commissions
	M4A_	Retail margins, sales of used goods
	M4B_	Transportation and related services
	M51_	Information, cultural and media products
	M52_	Depository credit, finance and insurance products
	M53_	Real estate and rental and leasing
	M54_	Professional research and development
	M5E_	Software products
	M5G_	Administrative and support, head office, waste management and remediation services
	M71_	Arts, entertainment and recreation services
	M72_	Accommodation and food services
M81_	Other services (except public administration)	
<b>Low-tradable Services</b>	M61_	Educational services
	M62_	Health care and social assistance

## F Derivation

This section characterizes the proofs of formulas that are used in this paper. We document the derivations for (a) the household’s problem with the CES utility function; (b) sectoral gross output price and productivity; (c) final consumption expenditure; (d) counterfactual strategy. In this section, we suppress the time subscript  $t$  for simplicity.

### F.1 Household’s optimization with CES utility

Sato (1975) derived a general group of CES utility functions: homothetic CES functions in the separable class and non-homothetic CES functions in both the separable and non-separable classes. Comin, Lashkari and Mestieri (2021) took the form of a separable non-homothetic CES class and implicitly formulated the utility function:

$$\sum_k \omega_k^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \left( \frac{C_i^k / L_i}{g(C_i / L_i)^{\phi_k}} \right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} = 1, \quad (\text{F.1})$$

where  $\omega_k$  denotes the relative weight of consumption bundle in sector  $k$ ;  $C_i^k$  is the real consumption index for sector  $k$  in region  $i$ ;  $C_i$  is the real aggregate consumption index, which measures the aggregate utility for  $C_i^k$  across sectors;  $g(\cdot)$  is a differentiable, monotonically increasing function;  $\sigma$  is the elasticity of substitution and  $\phi_k$  controls the relative income effect.

The standard CES utility function is a special case when  $g(C_i) = C_i$ . Following Duernecker, Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2023), we assign  $\phi_k = (\sigma - \epsilon_k) / (\sigma - 1)$  so that we can separate out income effect substitution effect in the household optimization problem. We can then rewrite Equation (F.1) as:

$$\sum_k \omega_k^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \left( \frac{C_i^k}{L_i} \right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \left( \frac{C_i}{L_i} \right)^{\frac{\epsilon_k - \sigma}{\sigma}} = 1. \quad (\text{F.2})$$

Taking account of (F.2) and the budget constraint, we can define a household Lagrangian that is essentially the same with Sposi (2019) and Comin, Lashkari and Mestieri (2021). For the outer layer encompassing two sectors, goods and services, let  $\sigma$  represent the elasticity of substitution between goods and services, and let  $P_i$  denote the aggregate price index for region  $i$ . The outer layer Lagrangian becomes:

$$\mathcal{L} = \frac{C_i}{L_i} - \rho \left[ \sum_k \omega_k^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \left( \frac{C_i^k}{L_i} \right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \left( \frac{C_i}{L_i} \right)^{\frac{\epsilon_k - \sigma}{\sigma}} - 1 \right] - \lambda \left[ P_i C_i - \sum_k P_i^k C_i^k \right].$$

The first order condition with respect to  $C_i^k$  results in:

$$-\rho \omega_k^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \left( \frac{C_i^k}{L_i} \right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}-1} \left( \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} \right) \left( \frac{1}{L_i} \right) \left( \frac{C_i}{L_i} \right)^{\frac{\epsilon_k - \sigma}{\sigma}} - \lambda P_i^k = 0,$$

Then we have:

$$\left( \frac{\sigma}{1-\sigma} \right) \frac{\lambda P_i^k C_i^k}{\rho} = \omega_k^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \left( \frac{C_i^k}{L_i} \right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \left( \frac{C_i}{L_i} \right)^{\frac{\epsilon_k - \sigma}{\sigma}}.$$

Taking the summation on both sides of the equation across sectors, gives:

$$\left( \frac{\sigma}{1-\sigma} \right) \frac{\lambda}{\rho} = \frac{1}{P_i C_i}. \quad (\text{F.3})$$

From the above, the following equation can be derived:

$$P_i^k C_i^k = \omega_k^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \left( \frac{C_i^k}{L_i} \right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \left( \frac{C_i}{L_i} \right)^{\frac{\epsilon_k - \sigma}{\sigma}} P_i C_i. \quad (\text{F.4})$$

Next, we have:

$$P_i^k C_i^k = L_i \omega_k \left( \frac{C_i}{L_i} \right)^{\epsilon_k} \left( \frac{P_i^k}{P_i} \right)^{1-\sigma} P_i, \quad k \in \{g, hs, ms, ls\}. \quad (\text{F.5})$$

Substituting (F.5) into the budget constraint yields:

$$P_i C_i = \sum_{k \in \{g, s\}} L_i \omega_k \left( \frac{C_i}{L_i} \right)^{\epsilon_k} \left( \frac{P_i^k}{P_i} \right)^{1-\sigma} P_i. \quad (\text{F.6})$$

Finally, we get the aggregate price index:

$$P_i = \left[ \sum_k \omega_k \left( \frac{C_i}{L_i} \right)^{\epsilon_k - 1} (P_i^k)^{1-\sigma} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}. \quad (\text{F.7})$$

## F.2 Price and productivity for gross output

Due to the data limitation, it is difficult to observe the sectoral gross output TFP and prices directly. Similar to Uy, Yi and Zhang (2013) and Spasi (2019), we derive a nominal value-added function and decompose it into value-added price index and quantities. We can then infer gross output TFP and prices implicitly from these two components. We start with the aggregate production function in sector  $k \in \{g, hs, ms, ls\}$ :

$$Y_i^k = A_i^k (L_i^k)^{\lambda_{i,k}} \left[ \prod_{n=g,hs,ms,ls} (M_i^{k,n})^{\gamma_{i,k,n}} \right]^{1-\lambda_{i,k}},$$

where  $A_i^k$  is the average measured gross output TFP. The first order condition for immediate inputs that are sourced from  $n$  gives:

$$P_i^n M_i^{k,n} = (1 - \lambda_{i,k}) \gamma_{i,k,n} P_i^k Y_i^k.$$

Substituting the optimal value of  $M$ , the aggregate production function can be rewritten as:

$$Y_i^k = A_i^k (L_i^k)^{\lambda_{i,k}} \left[ \prod_{n=g,hs,ms,ls} \left( \frac{\gamma_{i,k,n}}{P_i^n} \right)^{\gamma_{i,k,n}} [(1 - \lambda_{i,k}) P_i^k Y_i^k]^{\gamma_{i,k,n}} \right]^{1-\lambda_{i,k}}.$$

Recall that  $\sum_{n=g,hs,ms,ls} \gamma_{i,k,n} = 1$ , we can rearrange and obtain:

$$Y_i^k = (A_i^k)^{\frac{1}{\lambda_{i,k}}} L_i^k \left[ \prod_{n=g,hs,ms,ls} \left( \frac{\gamma_{i,k,n}}{P_i^n} \right)^{\gamma_{i,k,n}} [(1 - \lambda_{i,k}) P_i^k]^{\gamma_{i,k,n}} \right]^{\frac{1-\lambda_{i,k}}{\lambda_{i,k}}}.$$

Given that  $\lambda_{i,k}$  denotes the value-added share in output production, we can define the nominal value-added production as:

$$\begin{aligned} (VA_i^k)^{nominal} &= \lambda_{i,k} P_i^k Y_i^k \\ &= (A_i^k)^{\frac{1}{\lambda_{i,k}}} L_i^k \lambda_{i,k} (P_i^k)^{\frac{1}{\lambda_{i,k}}} \left[ \prod_{n=g,hs,ms,ls} \left( \frac{\gamma_{i,k,n}}{P_i^n} \right)^{\gamma_{i,k,n}} (1 - \lambda_{i,k})^{\gamma_{i,k,n}} \right]^{\frac{1-\lambda_{i,k}}{\lambda_{i,k}}}. \end{aligned}$$

Thus, the sectoral nominal value-added function can be decomposed into two components:

(1) value-added production function  $(VA_i^k)^{real}$ :

$$(VA_i^k)^{real} = (A_i^k)^{\frac{1}{\lambda_{i,k}}} L_i^k. \quad (\text{F.8})$$

(2) value-added price index  $(P_i^k)^{VA}$ :

$$(P_i^k)^{VA} = \lambda_{i,k} (P_i^k)^{\frac{1}{\lambda_{i,k}}} \left[ \prod_{n=g,hs,ms,ls} \left( \frac{\gamma_{i,k,n}}{P_i^n} \right)^{\gamma_{i,k,n}} (1 - \lambda_{i,k})^{\gamma_{i,k,n}} \right]^{\frac{1-\lambda_{i,k}}{\lambda_{i,k}}}. \quad (\text{F.9})$$

Equation (F.8) makes it possible to convert value-added TFP to gross output TFP, which implies that measured gross output TFP can be rearranged as:

$$A_i^k = \left( \frac{(VA_i^k)^{real}}{L_i^k} \right)^{\lambda_{i,k}}.$$

### F.3 Final consumption expenditure

We generate sectoral consumption expenditure using value-added and import-export data for each province and the RoW. Uy, Yi and Zhang (2013) documented this decomposition structure in a two-country case, and Sposi (2019) extended it to a multi-country version in which all sectors are able to trade. Details are shown below.

First, the sectoral gross output of province  $i$  can be purchased by any region and used either as an intermediate input or final consumption. We impute gross output by applying the input-output coefficient to value-added data and construct the following:

$$P_i^k Y_i^k = \frac{w_i L_i^k}{\lambda_{i,k}} = \sum_{j=1}^{J+1} \left( P_j^k C_j^k + \sum_{n=g,hs,ms,ls} P_j^k M_j^{n,k} \right) \pi_{j,i}^k \quad (\text{F.10})$$

Defining  $P_j^k Q_j^k$  as total absorption in sector  $k$  region  $j$ , yields:

$$P_i^k Y_i^k = \frac{w_i L_i^k}{\lambda_{i,k}} = \sum_{j=1}^{J+1} P_j^k Q_j^k \pi_{j,i}^k \quad (\text{F.11})$$

Separate out domestic absorption implies that, for  $k \in \{g, hs, ms, ls\}$

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{w_i L_i^k}{\lambda_{i,k}} &= \sum_{j=1; j \neq i}^{J+1} P_j^k Q_j^k \pi_{j,i}^k + P_i^k Q_i^k \pi_{i,i}^k \\
&= \sum_{j=1; j \neq i}^{J+1} P_j^k Q_j^k \pi_{j,i}^k + P_i^k Q_i^k \left( 1 - \sum_{j=1; j \neq i}^{J+1} \pi_{i,j}^k \right) \\
&= P_i^k Q_i^k + \sum_{j=1; j \neq i}^{J+1} P_j^k Q_j^k \pi_{j,i}^k - \sum_{j=1; j \neq i}^{J+1} P_i^k Q_i^k \pi_{i,j}^k
\end{aligned}$$

Thus, region  $i$ 's gross output function is decomposed into total absorption, total export, and total import on sector  $k$ 's composite good. we define  $NX_i^k$  as the region  $i$ 's net exports on sector  $k$ , it follows that

$$P_i^k Y_i^k = \sum_{j=1}^{J+1} P_j^k Q_j^k \pi_{j,i}^k = P_i^k Q_i^k + NX_i^k, \quad k \in \{g, hs, ms, ls\} \quad (\text{F.12})$$

If we link the net exports  $NX_i^k$  with the budget constraint 3.7, by summing up equations F.12 across sectors, we have:

$$\sum_{k=g,hs,ms,ls} P_i^k Y_i^k - \sum_{k=g,hs,ms,ls} P_i^k Q_i^k = \iota_i w_i L_i - \xi L_i \quad (\text{F.13})$$

Recall that the market clearing condition on the supply side is

$$Q_i^k = C_i^k + \sum_{n=g,hs,ms,ls} M_i^{n,k},$$

Multiplying by  $P_i^k$  implies that sector  $k$ 's total absorption will either serve as final expenditure or intermediate input:

$$P_i^k Q_i^k = P_i^k C_i^k + \sum_{n=g,hs,ms,ls} P_i^k M_i^{n,k}. \quad (\text{F.14})$$

The firm's optimality condition for intermediates used by sector  $n$  gives:

$$P_i^k M_i^{n,k} = (1 - \lambda_{i,n}) \gamma_{i,n,k} P_i^n Y_i^n. \quad (\text{F.15})$$

Thus,

$$P_i^k Q_i^k = P_i^k C_i^k + \sum_{n=g,hs,ms,ls} (1 - \lambda_{i,n}) \gamma_{i,n,k} P_i^n Y_i^n. \quad (\text{F.16})$$

where  $P_i^k Y_i^k = \sum_{j=1}^{J+1} P_j^k Q_j^k \pi_{j,i}^k$ , which gives the following market clearing condition

$$P_i^k Q_i^k = P_i^k C_i^k + \sum_{n=g,hs,ms,ls} (1 - \lambda_{i,n}) \gamma_{i,n,k} \sum_{j=1}^{J+1} \pi_{j,i}^n P_j^n Q_j^n$$

Using second part of (F.12), we can get:

$$P_i^k Q_i^k = P_i^k C_i^k + \sum_{n=g,hs,ms,ls} (1 - \lambda_{i,n}) \gamma_{i,n,k} (P_i^n Q_i^n + NX_i^n) \quad (\text{F.17})$$

For each sector, (F.17) can be written as:

$$P_i^g C_i^g = (1 - (1 - \lambda_{i,g}) \gamma_{i,g,g}) (P_i^g Q_i^g + NX_i^g) - NX_i^g - \sum_{n=hs,ms,ls} (1 - \lambda_{i,n}) \gamma_{i,n,k} (P_i^n Q_i^n + NX_i^n);$$

$$P_i^{hs} C_i^{hs} = (1 - (1 - \lambda_{i,hs}) \gamma_{i,hs,hs}) (P_i^{hs} Q_i^{hs} + NX_i^{hs}) - NX_i^{hs} - \sum_{n=g,ms,ls} (1 - \lambda_{i,n}) \gamma_{i,n,k} (P_i^n Q_i^n + NX_i^n);$$

$$P_i^{ms} C_i^{ms} = (1 - (1 - \lambda_{i,ms}) \gamma_{i,ms,ms}) (P_i^{ms} Q_i^{ms} + NX_i^{ms}) - NX_i^{ms} - \sum_{n=g,hs,ls} (1 - \lambda_{i,n}) \gamma_{i,n,k} (P_i^n Q_i^n + NX_i^n);$$

$$P_i^{ls} C_i^{ls} = (1 - (1 - \lambda_{i,ls}) \gamma_{i,ls,ls}) (P_i^{ls} Q_i^{ls} + NX_i^{ls}) - NX_i^{ls} - \sum_{n=g,hs,ms} (1 - \lambda_{i,n}) \gamma_{i,n,k} (P_i^n Q_i^n + NX_i^n);$$

Using (F.11) and (F.12) and yields

$$\begin{aligned} P_i^g C_i^g &= (1 - (1 - \lambda_{i,g}) \gamma_{i,g,g}) \frac{w_i L_i^g}{\lambda_{i,g}} - \sum_{n=hs,ms,ls} (1 - \lambda_{i,n}) \gamma_{i,n,k} \frac{w_i L_i^n}{\lambda_{i,n}} - NX_i^g \\ P_i^{hs} C_i^{hs} &= (1 - (1 - \lambda_{i,hs}) \gamma_{i,hs,hs}) \frac{w_i L_i^{hs}}{\lambda_{i,hs}} - \sum_{n=g,ms,ls} (1 - \lambda_{i,n}) \gamma_{i,n,k} \frac{w_i L_i^n}{\lambda_{i,n}} - NX_i^{hs} \\ P_i^{ms} C_i^{ms} &= (1 - (1 - \lambda_{i,ms}) \gamma_{i,ms,ms}) \frac{w_i L_i^{ms}}{\lambda_{i,ms}} - \sum_{n=g,hs,ls} (1 - \lambda_{i,n}) \gamma_{i,n,k} \frac{w_i L_i^n}{\lambda_{i,n}} - NX_i^{ms} \\ P_i^{ls} C_i^{ls} &= (1 - (1 - \lambda_{i,ls}) \gamma_{i,ls,ls}) \frac{w_i L_i^{ls}}{\lambda_{i,ls}} - \sum_{n=g,hs,ms} (1 - \lambda_{i,n}) \gamma_{i,n,k} \frac{w_i L_i^n}{\lambda_{i,n}} - NX_i^{ls} \end{aligned} \quad (\text{F.18})$$

By applying data on value-added, net exports, and input-output coefficients to the equation system above, we can generate the sector-province final expenditure. Data-implied sectoral expenditure share can then be simply constructed and used for calibration.

## F.4 Counterfactual strategy

We compare our benchmark economy with an economy with no service trade following these steps:

- (i) Assume that in our no-service-trade economy trade costs  $\{\tau_{ij}^k\}$  take a large value,  $10^6$ , such that there are no exports of service  $k$  from province  $j$  to province  $i$ , in equilibrium. Given the production and household preference parameters in the benchmark, we solve for equilibrium with the new trade costs.
- (ii) Given an initial guess to provincial wage  $w_i$ , we obtain sectoral prices  $P_i^k$  and input costs  $v_i^k$  by jointly solving Equations (3.2) and (3.3).
- (iii) Calculate import expenditure share  $\pi_{ij}^k$  using Equation (3.4).
- (iv) Compute the per capita return from global portfolio  $\xi$  from Equation (3.9). Note that values of  $\iota_i$  are unchanged in the counterfactual.<sup>59</sup>
- (v) Impute the counterfactual aggregate price  $P_i$  and aggregate real income  $C_i$  by jointly solving Equations (3.7) and (4.5). Then, we can construct sectoral expenditure  $E_i^k$  in the counterfactual using Equation (4.10).
- (vi) Compute sectoral real consumption  $C_i^k$  for each province using Equation (3.8) and (4.1).
- (vii) Compute the sectoral labor  $L_i^k$ , gross output  $P_i^k Y_i^k$ , sectoral absorption  $P_i^k Q_i^k$  and intermediate input usages  $P_i^k M_i^k$  by combining production equilibrium conditions (F.10), (F.11) and (F.16).
- (viii) Use resource constraint (F.13) in appendix and compute the per-capita excess demand as  $D_i = \left[ \left( \sum_{k=g,hs,ms,ls} P_i^k Y_i^k - \sum_{k=g,hs,ms,ls} P_i^k Q_i^k \right) - (\iota_i w_i L_i - \xi L_i) \right] / L_i$ .
- (ix) We slowly update the wage until the global market clears,  $D_i = 0$ . Specifically, we iterate the provincial wage using  $w_i' = w_i + \delta D_i$ , where we set  $\delta$  sufficiently small so that the wage vector  $w_i$  can slowly converge to the fixed point.

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<sup>59</sup>We assume that  $I_{ik}$  and  $G_{ik}$  are unchanged in the benchmark and in the counterfactual. Therefore, consumption expenditure shares are the main driver of  $E_i^k$  in our counterfactual.